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Abstract
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a
multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any reserve price
and any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale compli-
cate the winner’s curse and upset previous fixed-point methods to prove existence of
monotone equilibria. This paper restructures the fixed-point approach with respect to
previously unknown comparative statics of the resale mechanisms strategically chosen
after the auction. Despite speculation possibilities and the discontinuity-inducing uni-
form tie-breaking rule, at our equilibrium any above-reserve bid that stands a chance
to win is strictly increasing in the bidder’s use value.
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1 Introduction
Analyses of economic institutions are based on existence of equilibria of the underlying games.
Among them first-price auctions, widely used in practice, are of particular theoretical interest
because a discontinuity problem, caused by tying bids, may upset standard arguments of
equilibrium existence. To solve this discontinuity problem sophisticated methods based on
fixed-point theorems have been developed, one guaranteeing existence of monotone pure-
strategy equilibria due to Athey [1], McAdams [10], Reny and Zamir [16], and Reny [15],
and the other for mixed-strategy equilibria, augmented with endogenous tie-breaking rules,
due to Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame [5].1 However, neither method has been applied
to dynamic games such as auctions with resale.2 With resale, foundational assumptions need
to be reexamined with respect to the continuation play at resale. For example, a main hurdle
for the fixed-point approach to monotone equilibria is the winner’s curse, which has been
handled in the literature by bounding it with sufficiently strong primitive assumptions. But
resale would endogenize the winner’s curse and renders it unbounded a priori, as a bidder
could magnify the winner’s curse for the rivals by acting as a high-bidding speculator so that
his rivals might want to lose now and buy the good at resale. This paper restructures the
monotone pure-strategy fixed-point approach with respect to comparative statics of resale
thereby proving existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, with increasing bid functions,
for a two-stage game of any first-price sealed-bid auction with resale.
1.1 Where Is the Monotone Fixed-Point Approach Stuck?
The general idea of this fixed-point approach, dating back to the general equilibrium liter-
ature,3 is to approximate the original economy by some sequence of finite economies where
equilibria exist and then prove that a limit point of the sequence of such approximation
equilibria is an equilibrium of the original one. For auctions, the main impediment to such
passing-to-limit arguments is a discontinuity problem caused by ties. For instance, in Fig-
ure 1, each bidder i ∈ {1, 2, 3} plays an equilibrium bidding strategy βmi , a nondecreasing
1 Kotowski [6] has a recent application of the fixed-point methods in auctions with budget constraints.
2 The conceptual awkwardness of the no-resale assumption has been noted by Zheng [19] and Hafalir and
Krishna [4]. The possibility of resource misallocation, which may occur at equilibrium in first-price auctions
among ex ante different bidders given the no-resale assumption, induces bidders to attempt resale.
3 For example, Werner [18] and Magill and Quinzii [9].
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function from his type ti to a bid, in the approximation auction game indexed by m; when
the sequence (βm1 , β
m
2 , β
m
3 )
∞
m=1 converges to its limit, a nonvanishing mass of bids, submitted
by bidder 1 of types in [a1, z1] and bidder 2 of types in [a2, z2], are clustered within an interval
collapsing into the point x, which becomes an atom (while bidder 3’s types that bid within
the cluster vanish into a point z3). The crucial stage of the fixed-point approach is to demon-
strate a contradiction to the approximation equilibria by arguing that some types of at least
one of the bidders, say some elements in [a2, z2], strictly prefer to deviate from their β
m
2 -bids
within the cluster at x to a bid say x′ slightly above the cluster. This no-tie argument, due
0
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Figure 1: A tying situation
to Athey [1] and now standard within the fixed-point literature, can be summarized into two
steps (Claims 1 and 2, Athey [1, Appendix]), illustrated here from bidder 2’s viewpoint:
i. One needs to prove that, as bidder 2’s type increases from a2 to z2, his preference
to winning increases strictly, and eventually, with sufficiently high types, he strictly
prefers to win conditional on the winning event that he can win with the βm2 -bids within
the cluster at x, which roughly corresponds to the event “(t1, t3) ∈ [0, a1]× [0, z3]”.
ii. For the desired contradiction it suffices to show that the types obtained in the previous
step strictly prefer to deviate to x′ from their βm2 -bids within the cluster at x. This
was done by proving that their expected net gains from winning cannot decrease when
they consider only the event in which the deviation is pivotal, i.e., that bidder 2
cannot prefer less to win when the conditioned event moves from the winning event
“(t1, t3) ∈ [0, a1]× [0, z3]” up to the pivotal event “(t1, t3) ∈ [a1, z1]× [0, z3]”.
3
To see the troubles, consider an independent private values model where ti is bidder i’s
use value of the good for sale. Step (i) can fail because a bidder with high types, say the
elements of [a2, z2] in Figure 1, may eventually acquire and consume the good whether he
wins it now or buys it later at resale. Then the type t2 in bidder 2’s payoff as a winner is
canceled out by the t2 in his payoff as a loser, so his net gain from winning does not increase
in t2, and [a2, z2] need not contain a type that strictly prefers to win, contrary to Step (i).
To consider a case where Step (ii) is unsalvageable, suppose that, within the bid cluster
at x in Figure 1, bidder 1’s bids are above bidder 2’s, so that bidder 1 wins when they both
bid in the cluster. Thus, the winning event for bidder 2, when he bids within the cluster, is
“(t1, t3) ∈ [0, a1] × [0, z3]”, while the pivotal event for bidder 2’s deviation from the cluster
to x′ is “(t1, t3) ∈ [a1, z1]× [0, z3]”. If Athey’s Step (ii) worked, bidder 2’s preference to win
would not diminish when the conditioned event moves from the winning event to the pivotal
one. Given resale, however, the opposite can be true. For instance, let the probability of
[a3, z3] be so large that, conditional on the winning event [0, a1]× [0, z3], if bidder 2 loses then
with a large probability he buys the good from the types [a3, z3] of bidder 3. By contrast,
conditional on the pivotal event [a1, z1] × [0, z3], if bidder 2 loses, he buys the good from
bidder 1 with types in [a1, z1]. Since [a3, z3] is higher than [a1, z1] in strong-set order, the
resale price offered to bidder 2, in expectation, is higher in the winning event than in the
pivotal event. Thus, when the conditioned event moves up to the pivotal one, bidder 2’s
expected payoff from losing, or roughly speaking the winner’s curse, becomes higher. On
the other hand, bidder 2’s payoff from winning is invariant to his rivals’ types because, from
Figure 1, a2 > z3 > z1 and hence if he wins then he will consume the good to obtain its use
value t2. Consequently, when he takes into account that his deviation is pivotal, bidder 2
prefers strictly less to win, contrary to Step (ii).
The fundamental reason why Athey’s no-tie argument does not work here is that a
monotonicity assumption in the literature may fail given resale. The assumption stipulates
that a bidder’s ex post net payoff from winning is nondecreasing in his rivals’ types (e.g.,
A.1.iii of Reny and Zamir). With resale, by contrast, a winner’s payoff may fail to be
nondecreasing in his rivals’ types because the optimal resale mechanism may resell the good
to a subsidized bidder who pays a lower price than someone else, so the ex post resale revenue
may decrease when a subsidized bidder’s type rises to become the buyer at resale. A loser’s
payoff may fail to be nonincreasing because a loser’s gain from trading with reseller j may
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be larger than that with reseller k. Thus, when j has a slightly higher type to become the
reseller instead of k, this bidder’s ex post payoff increases. Hence the ex post net gain from
winning may fail to be nondecreasing in the rivals’ types.
In addition to the no-tie argument, two other important conditions, which did not
appear difficult in the received literature, become problematic given resale. One is single
crossing, crucial to guarantee existence of the aforementioned approximation equilibria. The
other is payoff security, indispensable to deliver the passing-to-limit result in the literature.
The single-crossing condition says that if a bidder prefers a high bid to a low one then the
preference remains so when his type gets higher. The primitive assumption from which the
literature obtained this condition is single crossing for every possible realized type profile
(e.g., A.1.iv of Reny and Zamir). With resale, the assumption fails when an increase of a
bidder’s type turns him from a speculator to a consumer, with high types of his rivals.4 The
payoff-security condition says that bidding slightly above an atom of the rivals’ bids does
not make a bidder worse-off than bidding at the atom. In the literature, verification of this
condition is simply Step (ii),5 which as illustrated above can fail with resale.
1.2 A Road Map of This Paper
This paper is devoted to overcoming the challenges that resale presents to the fixed-point
approach. To capture the endogenous nature of resale, we assume that the resale mechanism
is a reseller-optimal auction a` la Myerson [13] based on post-auction beliefs. Athey’s critical
steps are restructured with respect to previously unknown comparative statics properties of
the Myerson resale auction, with initial bids or post-auction beliefs being the parameters.
Our journey starts with an increasing-difference theorem (Theorem 1), which through
its single-crossing implication ensures existence of the aforementioned approximation equi-
libria. Then, to pass their equilibrium condition to the limit, two building blocks are estab-
lished. First is a no-tie theorem saying that ties do not occur at a limit point of a sequence of
such approximating equilibria (Theorem 2). The second is a payoff-security theorem saying
4 While the higher bid brings about higher revenues for the speculator-type since he charges higher
resale prices due to the higher posterior about the willingness-to-pay of his clientele, the consumer-type,
who benefits from none of such revenue effect, strictly prefers the lower bid, which costs him less. This also
upsets a slightly weaker single-crossing assumption proposed by Quah and Strulovici [14, Th. 4(c), p28].
5 For example, the displayed formula (A.5) in Reny and Zamir [16].
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that a bidder suffers little loss from avoiding his rivals’ atoms at this limit point (Theorem 3).
Theorems 2 and 3 together deliver the existence theorem (Theorem 4).
The first step of our no-tie argument is to prove that, if a tie at the limit occurs
then there exists a dominant bidder whose probability of winning the tie converges to one
(Lemma 8). In Figure 1, for instance, the infimum a1 of bidder 1’s types that bid within
the cluster at x is less than all elements of [a2, z2], bidder 2’s types bidding in the cluster.
Consequently, with types being use values of the good, conditional on the pivotal event
“(t2, t3) ∈ [a2, z2] × [0, z3]” of the bid increase from the cluster to x′, bidder 1 would gain
nothing from trading with the reseller player 2. I.e., the the bid increase renders zero winner’s
curse for bidder 1. On the other hand, the bid increase generates a revenue effect by adding
a mass of high types [a2, z2] to bidder 1’s clientele thereby generating a significant increase
in his expected resale revenue (Lemma 9, due to a property of the optimal resale mechanism
proved in §A.1.2). Thus, bidder 1 with types nearby a1 would strictly prefer to deviate unless
within the cluster his bids are almost exclusively on the top layer so that he mostly outbids
the tying rivals.6 Hence bidder 1 is the dominant bidder.
To derive a contradiction from the supposed occurrence of a tie, our next step is to
prove that some bidder who is supposed to bid just below the dominant rival within the tying
cluster, such as bidder 2 in Figure 1, strictly prefers to deviate to a bid slightly above the
cluster. The proof, from §5.2.1 to §5.2.5, is nontrivial because the winner’s curse for bidder 2
is not negligible. Contrary to the case of bidder 1, even the infimum a2 of the atom-bidding
types of bidder 2 can gain from buying the good at resale from some atom-bidding types
of bidder 1, as a2 > a1. This nontrivial winner’s curse is handled in two substeps. First,
we prove that if [a2, z2] contains some sufficiently high types then for such types of bidder 2
the winner’s curse is more than outweighed by the “winner’s blessing” (payoff from winning
conditional on the pivotal event). Then he strictly prefers the deviation (§5.2.3, due to a
property of the optimal resale mechanism proved in §A.1.1). Second, in the other case, we
find some types in [a2, z2] for whom the winner’s curse is nearly balanced by the winner’s
6 Although the winner’s curse is null in this case, Athey’s no-tie argument, without taking into account
the revenue effect, still cannot be replicated to prove that bidder 1 strictly prefers the higher bid. Even if
her Step (i) works, so that bidder 1’s preference to win strictly increases in his type on [a1, z1] conditional
on his winning event, his preference may still be reversed when the conditioned event switches to the pivotal
event. That is because his ex post payoff from winning may fail to be nondecreasing in his rivals’ types, as
explained above regarding the monotonicity assumption.
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blessing. This is done by deducing the viability of bidder 2’s deviation from the profitability
of bidder 1’s on-path action despite information asymmetry between them (§5.2.4).7 Then
the revenue effect of the deviation, as in the case for bidder 1 in the previous paragraph,
implies bidder 2’s strict incentive to deviate (§5.2.5), which delivers the no-tie theorem.
In the received literature, a no-tie theorem would have sufficed the passing-to-limit ar-
gument, as the aforementioned payoff-security condition was obtained by repeating Step (ii)
in Athey’s argument. Not so with resale, because as explained previously the monotonic-
ity assumption may fail. With this assumption, Athey’s Step (ii) is accomplished without
relying on any equilibrium condition. Without the assumption, our no-tie argument relies
on the condition that the deviant bidder is supposed to bid at the cluster according to the
approximation equilibria (so that the deviation costs him little increase of payment). But
such an equilibrium condition is unavailable when payoff security is being considered.
Our solution, Theorem 3, is due to a general feature of the increasing-difference the-
orem that allows bids to be atoms. This general feature is obtained by comparing resale
mechanisms in resale environments that are irregular, necessitating the ironing procedure
(Appendix C). Increasing difference allows us to establish payoff security for low types, for
whom the winner’s curse of skipping an atom is negligible as in the first step of our no-tie
argument, and then extend payoff security to all higher types. Theorem 3 is also due to
comparative statics of a reseller’s expected revenues when the distribution of a bidder turns
from an irregular to a regular one (Corollary 4). The complication of irregular resale settings
is unavoidable to a reseller whose winning bid is an atom of his rivals (Lemma 2.b), and
such an atomic case is unavoidable to us because payoff security is precisely about bidding
at a rival’s atom (whereas the no-tie theorem is about bidding nearby the atom). Both
Theorems 2 and 3 combined, the existence proof is complete.
The existence theorem is more general than previous results in first-price auctions with
resale in that it allows for any reserve price and any finite number of differently distributed
bidders while the previous literature assumed either two bidders or at most two kinds of
bidders ex ante, with bidders of the same kind drawn from the same distribution. Notwith-
7 The deduction, consisting of Lemmas 11 and 12, is based on two nontrivial facts. First, bidder 2 can
nearly mimic bidder 1’s optimal resale mechanism in the event of the tie, largely due to the fact that bidder 1
is the dominant rival. Second, the expected revenue produced by a fixed Myerson auction does not decrease
when the weight of a bidder’s type is pushed upward (Lemma 19, proved here despite the fact that the ex
post revenue generated by a Myerson auction need not be nondecreasing in a bidder’s type).
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standing some remarkable results in this literature, such as Garratt and Tro¨ger [2] in mixed
strategies and Hafalir and Krishna [4], Lebrun [7, 8] and Vira´g [17] in pure strategies, the
two-distribution assumption has been crucial to their differential equations method.
Nevertheless, the existence theorem is restricted by assumptions such as undisclosed
losing bids in the initial auction, common infimum for bidders’ prior supports, and a reseller’s
power to choose resale mechanisms, though these are common assumptions in the current
auction-resale literature such as those cited above as well as Zheng [19] and Garratt, Tro¨ger
and Zheng [3].8 Now that the existence proof has shown it feasible to extend the fixed-
point approach beyond its previous confines of treating an auction as an isolated event,
investigations of its further expansion are at hand.
2 The Model
2.1 The Auction-Resale Game
There are two periods, a finite set I of bidders, and an indivisible good. For each i ∈ I,
bidder i’s type, or use value of the good, is independently drawn from a commonly known
distribution Fi, with the realized value privately known to i. In period one, every bidder i
submits as his bid an element of {l} ∪Bi, where the losing bid l < 0 amounts to nonpartic-
ipation in the period-one auction, and Bi ⊆ [r,∞) is the set of serious bids admissible for
bidder i, with reserve price r ≥ 0 for all bidders. Ties are broken randomly and uniformly
with equal probabilities. If the good is sold then, after the winner is selected, the highest
bid and the winner’s identity are announced publicly, with nothing else disclosed,9 and the
winner pays for the good at the price equal to his winning bid. Then period two starts and
the period-one winner chooses a selling mechanism that offers resale to the other bidders
in I, called losing bidders . A selling mechanism is any game form to be played by the losing
bidders. After the players have acted given this mechanism, the entire game ends.
Each bidder is risk-neutral in his payoff, equal to his use value, if and only if he is the
8 Zheng [19] did not assume common infimum of the priors but made some other assumptions. Hafalir
and Krishna [4] and Lebrun [7, 8] considered some other disclosure policies and weaker bargaining power of
the reseller based on the two-distribution assumption and take-it-or-leave offers as the resale mechanism.
9 If the action of a losing bidder is also disclosed, pure-strategy equilibrium is unlikely to exist unless the
loser gets to choose the resale mechanism.
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final owner of the good, plus the total money transfer from others to him over both periods.
Assume for any bidder i that the prior Fi has differentiable and strictly positive den-
sity fi on its support Ti :=
[
0, ti
]
, with prior virtual utility ti−(1−Fi(ti))/fi(ti) having strictly
positive derivative with respect to ti on Ti. Denote T−i := Πk∈I\{i}Tk and T := Πk∈ITk.10
A profile (βi)i∈I of bid functions, with βi : Ti → {l}∪Bi for each i ∈ I, is said monotone
if and only if βi is a weakly increasing function for each i ∈ I, i.e., everyone’s period-one bid
is weakly increasing in his use value of the good.
2.2 Boldfaced Symbols for Random Variables
Denote bidder i’s type by ti as the random variable and ti as the realized value. Denote
t−i := (tk)k∈I\{i} and t−i := (tk)k∈I\{i} as the random vector and the realization for the type
profile across rivals of i. Analogously, denote t := (ti, t−i) := (tk)k∈I , t := (ti, t−i) := (tk)k∈I ,
t−(i,j) := (tk)k∈I\{i,j} and t−(i,j) := (tk)k∈I\{i,j}. Denote E[g(x)] for the expected value of any
function g of the random variable or random vector x, with the random variable/vector bold-
faced, based on the prior distributions. Denote E[g(x) |E] for the expected value conditional
on event E, 1[E] for the indicator function of event E, and Pr{E} := E [1[E]].
3 The Endogenous Payoff Functions
We shall derive a bidder’s expected payoff in the auction-resale game from a continuation
equilibrium at the resale stage, which implements a reseller-optimal auction a` la Myerson [13].
3.1 Continuation Equilibrium at Resale
3.1.1 Atoms and Inverse Images of Bids
For any weakly increasing function βi : Ti → R and any b ≥ βi(0), denote β−1i (b) for the
inverse image and, letting supS := inf S := 0 when a subset S of Ti is empty, denote
β−1i,inf(b) := sup{ti ∈ Ti : βi(ti) < b}, (1)
β−1i,sup(b) := sup{ti ∈ Ti : βi(ti) ≤ b}. (2)
10 The common infimum assumption of bidders’ prior supports is used in Lemmas 15 and 17. The positive-
derivative assumption of prior virtual utilities is slightly stronger than the usual one that requires only strict
monotonicity. The strengthening is needed in Corollary 2 and Lemmas 2.a.ii, 12 and 15.
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Note that if β−1i (b) 6= ∅ then β−1i,inf(b) = inf β−1i (b) and β−1i,sup(b) = sup β−1i (b).
For any bidder i, an atom of βi means a bid b ∈ Bi such that β−1i (b) is a nondegenerate
interval, i.e., β−1i,inf(b) < β
−1
i,sup(b). An atom of β−i, with β−i := (βj)j 6=i, means an atom of βj
for some j ∈ I \ {i}. Likewise, an atom of β := (βj)j∈I means an atom of βj for some j ∈ I.
3.1.2 Public Histories and Posterior Beliefs
If bidder i wins with bid bi in period one (so bi > l, i.e., bi ∈ Bi) then (i, bi) denotes the
commonly known public history . Given any public history (i, bi), with every losing bidder k
(k 6= i) having played according to βk, the posterior distribution Fk(· | i, bi, β) of tk is
derived from Bayes’s rule based on the observation that k has been defeated either because
βk(tk) < bi or because βk(tk) = bi and k did not win the tie-breaking lottery.
Lemma 1 For any public history (i, bi), any monotone profile β, and any k 6= i, the density
fk(· | i, bi, β) of Fk(· | i, bi, β) is finite and strictly positive on its support
[
0, β−1k,sup(bi)
]
;
if bi is not an atom of βk then fk(· | i, bi, β) is continuous on this posterior support; else
fk(· | i, bi, β) is continuous at all but one point in the posterior support.
Proof Appendix C.
3.1.3 Posterior Virtual Utilities
For each losing bidder k ∈ I \ {i} in public history (i, bi), define Vk,bi,β : Tk → R by
Vk,bi,β(tk) := Vk(tk | bi, β) :=
 tk −
1−Fk(tk|i,bi,β)
fk(tk|i,bi,β) if tk ≤ β
−1
k,sup(bi)
β−1k,sup(bi) if tk ≥ β−1k,sup(bi),
(3)
and define the posterior virtual utility function for losing bidder k 6= i to be either Vk,bi,β if bi
is not an atom of βk, or the ironed version of Vk,bi,β according to Myerson’s [13] procedure
if bi is an atom of βk. By the previous and the next lemmas, Vk,bi,β fails to be monotone
and hence ironing is needed precisely when the winning bid bi is an atom of βk. Denote k’s
posterior virtual utility by V k,i,bi,β(tk) or V k(tk | i, bi, β).11
Lemma 2 There exists λ > 0 such that, for any public history (i, bi), any monotone pro-
file β, and any k 6= i:
11 When the winning bid bi is an atom of βk, the posterior distribution of tk depends on i by Eq. (68).
Hence the notation i for the winner in the ironed posterior virtual utility function V k,i,bi,β cannot be dropped.
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a. if bi is not an atom of βk, then:
i. for any tk ∈ Tk, V k,i,bi,β(tk) = Vk,bi,β(tk) and, if ti ∈
[
0, β−1k,sup(bi)
]
,
Vk,bi,β(tk) = tk −
Fk
(
β−1k,sup(bi)
)− Fk(tk)
fk(tk)
; (4)
ii. Vk,bi,β is strictly increasing on
[
0, β−1k,sup(bi)
]
, at a rate greater than or equal to λ,
and is constant on
[
β−1k,sup(bi), tk
]
;
iii. V k,i,bi,β is continuous on Tk;
b. for any i, i′ ∈ I \ {k}, if b′ > b ≥ r, then V k,i,b,β ≥ V k,i′,b′,β on
[
0, β−1k,sup(b)
]
.
Proof Appendix C.
3.1.4 Resale Mechanisms
Given any public history (i, bi), by Lemma 1, Myerson’s [13] characterization of optimal
auctions is applicable to our reseller i’s auction-design problem.12 Specifically, the mechanism
Mi(bi, ti, β) defined below is optimal for the bidder-turned reseller i with type ti ∈ Ti:
a. each losing bidder k 6= i independently submits a report, say tk, of his type;
b. for any t−i ∈ T−i, the good is allocated to
i. either a k 6= i such that V k(tk | i, bi, β) ≥ max
{
ti,maxj /∈{i,k} V j(tj | i, bi, β)
}
ii. or i when ti ≥ maxj 6=i V j(tj | i, bi, β);
if there are multiple k in alternative (i) or the inequalities in both (i) and (ii) are true,
the tie is broken randomly and uniformly with equal probabilities;
c. if k 6= i is allocated the good then the payment k delivers to i equals
pk,i,bi,β(t−k) := inf
{
t′k ∈ Tk : V k,i,bi,β(t′k) ≥ max
{
ti, max
j∈I\{i,k}
V j,i,bi,β(tj)
}}
; (5)
if k is not allocated the good then k pays zero to i.
12 Myerson [13] assumed continuous density throughout a bidder’s support while our posterior density
may be discontinuous at one point (Lemma 1). But this difference does not affect Myerson’s result. Also
see Footnote 9 of Garratt, Tro¨ger and Zheng [3] for an explanation why Myerson’s result is applicable here
despite the possibility that the reseller may be privately informed of her type.
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Following directly from Myerson’s result, we have—
Lemma 3 For any public history (i, bi), any ti ∈ Ti and any monotone profile β, if the
posterior belief of tj is Fj(· | i, bi, β) for each j 6= i, then it is a continuation equilibrium for
player i to choose Mi(bi, ti, β) and everyone else to participate and be truthful.
For any public history (i, bi), if bi is not an atom of β−i, then Lemma 2.a implies that,
for any losing bidder k 6= i, the posterior virtual utility function V k,i,bi,β is equal to the strictly
increasing function Vk,bi,β on the posterior support
[
0, β−1k,sup(bi)
]
of tk, hence for any t−k such
that bidder k of type tk wins inMi(bi, ti, β) (i.e., max
{
ti,maxj∈I\{i,k} Vj,bi,β(tj)
} ≤ β−1k,sup(bi)),
Eq. (5) is simplified to, with V −1k,bi,β denoting the inverse function of Vk,bi,β,
pk,i,bi,β(t−k) = V
−1
k,bi,β
(
max
{
ti, max
j∈I\{i,k}
Vj,bi,β(tj)
})
. (6)
3.2 The Payoff from the Auction
3.2.1 The Indicator Function for Winning
The uniform tie-breaking rule corresponds to a random vector (ρi)i∈I subject to two condi-
tions: (i) for any realization (ρi)i∈I , ρi ∈ {1, . . . , |I|} for any i ∈ I, and ρi 6= ρj for any i 6= j;
and (ii) any such realization has the same probability. The interpretation is that if ρi > ρj
then bidder i beats j in the coin toss when their bids are tied.
For any realization (ρk)k∈I of the uniform tie-breaking lottery, any i ∈ I, any J ⊆ I\{i},
and any profile (bk)k∈J∪{i} of bids across bidders in J ∪ {i}, write
(i, bi) (ρk)k∈I (bk)k∈J , or briefly (i, bi)  (bk)k∈J ,
if and only if
bi ∈ Bi and
[
bi > max
k∈J
bk or
[
bi = max
k∈J
bk and ∀k ∈ argmax
j∈J
bj : ρi > ρk
]]
.
And write (i, bi) 6 (bk)k∈J if and only if (i, bi)  (bk)k∈J is not true.
For example, 1
[
(i, bi)  (βk(tk))k∈I\{i}
]
is the indicator function for the event that
bidder i wins, possibly after tie-breaking, with bids bi from i and βk(tk) from each rival k.
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3.2.2 Ex Post Payoff for a Winner
For any public history (i, bi) and any (ti, t−i) ∈ Ti × T−i, define Wi(t−i | bi, ti, β) to be the
payoff for player i when i wins at the initial auction with bid bi and offers resale via the
Myerson auctionMi(bi, ti, β) according to the continuation equilibrium specified in Lemma 3,
when rivals of i abide by the monotone profile β−i in period one and the profile of realized
types across other players happens to be t−i. That bidder i wins with bid bi implies bi ∈ Bi.
For the case bi /∈ Bi, i.e., bi = l, define Wi(t−i | l, ti, β) := 0.
If a serious bid bi (i.e., bi ∈ Bi) is not an atom of β−i, one can derive from Lemmas 2
and 3 that, for all t−i ∈
∏
k 6=i
[
0, β−1k,sup(bi)
]
except a set of measure zero and for any ti ∈ Ti,
Wi(t−i | bi, ti, β) = ti1
[
ti > max
k 6=i
Vk(tk | bi, β)
]
(7)
+
∑
j 6=i
pj,i,bi,β(t−j)1
[
Vj(tj | bi, β) > max
{
ti, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk(tk | bi, β)
}]
.
3.2.3 Ex Post Payoff for a Losing Bidder
For any distinct bidders i 6= j and any (ti, t−i) = (ti, tj, t−(i,j)) ∈ Ti × Tj × T−(i,j) such
that βj(tj) ∈ Bj and βj(tj) ≥ βk(tk) for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}, define Lij(t−i | ti, β) to be the
payoff for player i when bidder j wins at the initial auction with bid βj(tj) and offers resale
via mechanism Mj (βj(tj), tj, β) according to the continuation equilibrium, when everyone is
supposed by other players to abide by the monotone profile β in period one and the profile
of realized types across bidders happens to be (ti, tj, t−(i,j)).
Note that Lij(t−i | ti, β) is invariant to i’s period-one bid bi, due to the fact that
reseller j in choosing resale mechanisms does not know the bids from the losing bidders.
If βj(tj) is not an atom of β−j then, as in the previous case for Wi, for any i 6= j, for
all t−(i,j) ∈
∏
k/∈{i,j}
[
0, β−1k,sup(βj(tj))
]
but a set of measure zero, and for any ti ∈ Ti,
Lij(t−i | ti, β) =
(
ti − pi,j,βj(tj),β(t−i)
)
1
[
Vi,βj(tj),β(ti) > max
{
tj, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,βj(tj),β(ti)
}]
. (8)
Before the auction outcome is announced in period one, bidder i does not know who
is the winner, but he knows that, at any realized type profile t ∈ T , if he loses the auction
then the winner is selected from I \ {i} with each rival k ∈ I \ {i} bidding βk(tk). Thus, i’s
ex post payoff from losing, given any realized type profile (ti, t−i) ∈ T , is equal to
Li(t−i | ti, β) :=
∑
j 6=i
Pr
{
(j, βj(tj))  (βk(tk))k∈I\{i,j}
}
Lij(t−i | ti, β). (9)
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3.2.4 Interim Expected Payoff
Denote Ui(bi, ti, β) for type-ti bidder i’s expected payoff in the entire game from bidding bi
in period one followed by the continuation equilibrium specified by Lemma 3, provided that
everyone else abides by the monotone profile β at period one. Thus,
Ui(bi, ti, β) = E
[
1
[
(i, bi)  (βk(tk))k∈I\{i}
]
(Wi(t−i | bi, ti, β)− bi − Li(t−i | ti, β))
]
+E [Li(t−i | ti, β)] , (10)
where the boldfaced letters inside the expectation operator E denote the random variables.
Since Wi and Li are derived from the continuation equilibrium at resale, we obtain a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the period-one bid functions best reply one another:13
Lemma 4 If a monotone profile (βi)i∈I of period-one bid functions constitutes a Nash equi-
librium, across almost all bidder-types, with respect to the interim expected payoff functions
(Ui(·, ·, β))i∈I given by Eq. (10), then (βi)i∈I coupled with the continuation play characterized
in Lemma 3 constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the auction-resale game.
4 Increasing Difference
Based on comparative statics of the continuation equilibrium, Theorem 1 says that a bidder’s
expected-payoff difference due to an increase in his period-one bid is nondecreasing in his
type. It should be noted that this theorem allows the bids to be atoms. Hence the proof
needs to consider resale environments whose posterior virtual utilities need to be ironed.
Theorem 1 (increasing difference) For any bidder i, any monotone profile β of bid func-
tions, and any b′′i > b
′
i, Ui(b
′′
i , ti, β)− Ui(b′i, ti, β) is weakly increasing in ti throughout Ti.
This property is due to a relationship between period-one bids and the final alloca-
tion after resale (Propositions 1 and 2), which say that higher period-one bids imply higher
probabilities of being the final owner of the good. This relationship implies the increas-
ing difference property through the payoff-equivalence routine in mechanism design. With
notations and lemmas introduced in §4.1–§4.3, the proof of the theorem is completed in §4.4.
13 The only kind of off-path events relevant to our consideration is that a bidder loses the initial auction
while he is expected to win at every possible state. The deviation that causes such an off-path event can be
easily deterred by some off-path belief adopted by the reseller.
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4.1 Final Allocations
For any bidder i, any monotone profile β of bid functions, and any t := (tk)k∈I ∈ T , define:
• Qi(bi, t, β) to be the probability with which i is the final owner in the continuation
equilibrium (Lemma 3) conditional on the public history (i, bi), when bi ∈ Bi and the
realized type profile is t (if bi /∈ Bi, i.e., bi = l, then define Qi(bi, t, β) := 0);
• qij(t, β) to be the probability with which i is the final owner in the continuation equi-
librium (Lemma 3) conditional on the public history (j, βj(tj)), when βj(tj) ∈ Bj and
the realized type profile is t (if βj(tj) = l then define qij(t, β) := 0);
• qi(t, β) to be the probability with which i is the final owner when some rival of i wins
the period-one auction and offers resale according to the continuation equilibrium, i.e.,
qi(t, β) =
∑
j 6=i
Pr
{
(j, βj(tj))  (βk(tk))k∈I\{i,j}
}
qij(t, β). (11)
4.2 The Envelope Condition
For any bidder i, define (with boldfaced letters denoting random variables):
W i(bi, ti, β) := E
[
Wi(t−i | bi, ti, β) | (i, bi)  (βj(tj))j∈I\{i}
]
, (12)
Li(bi, ti, β) := E
[
Li(t−i | ti, β) | (i, bi) 6 (βj(tj))j∈I\{i}
]
, (13)
Qi(bi, t, β) := E
[
Qi(bi, ti, t−i, β) | (i, bi)  (βj(tj))j∈I\{i}
]
, (14)
qi(bi, ti, β) := E
[
qi(ti, t−i, β) | (i, bi) 6 (βj(tj))j∈I\{i}
]
. (15)
The next lemma follows from the Milgrom-Segal envelope theorem [11].
Lemma 5 For any i ∈ I, any bi ∈ Bi ∪ {l}, and any monotone profile β, the functions
W i(bi, ·, β) and Li(bi, ·, β) are absolutely continuous and, for any ti ∈ Ti,
W i(bi, ti, β) = W i(bi, 0, β) +
∫ ti
0
Qi(bi, τi, β)dτi, (16)
Li(bi, ti, β) =
∫ ti
0
qi(bi, τi, β)dτi. (17)
Proof Appendix D.
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4.3 Initial Bids and the Final Allocation
Propositions 1 and 2 are about ex post probabilities conditional on the profile of realized
types across all bidders, not to be confused with expected probabilities.
Proposition 1 For any i ∈ I and any monotone profile β, if b′′i > b′i then Qi(b′′i , t, β) ≥
Qi(b
′
i, t, β) for any ti ∈ Ti and any t−i such that βk(tk) ≤ b′ for all k 6= i.
Proof Appendix D.
Propositions 1 says that if a bidder wins the initial auction then his probability of
eventually keeping the good cannot be lower had he submitted any higher bid. The intuition
is that a higher winning bid would make the winner think more highly about the losing
bidders’ willingness to pay and hence set higher reserve prices. Consequently, given the
same realized types, his mechanism results in no resale with a higher probability.
Proposition 2 For any bidders i 6= j and any monotone profile, Qi(bi, t, β) ≥ qi(t, β) for
any ti ∈ Ti and any t−i ∈ T−i such that bi ≥ maxk 6=i βk(tk).14
Proof Appendix D.
Proposition 2 says that a bidder is more likely to become the final owner of the good
when he is the reseller than when he is a potential buyer at resale. This is similar to an
elementary economics fact that a monopolist who cannot perfectly discriminate its potential
buyers would under-supply its goods. The monopolist at resale, our reseller would not resell
the good without a price markup above her own use value, while potential buyers are willing
to pay for it at any price not exceeding their use values.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 1
By Eqs. (10), (12) and (13),
Ui(bi, ti, β) = E [1 [bi  t−i]]
(
W i(bi, ti, β)− bi
)
+ E [1 [bi 6 t−i]]Li(bi, ti, β), (18)
where bi  t−i is a shorthand for i’s winning event (i, bi)  (βk(tk))k∈I\{i}, and bi 6 t−i its
complement. For any b′′i > b
′
i, let ∆Ui(ti) := Ui(b
′′
i , ti, β)− Ui(b′i, ti, β). By Eq. (18),
∆Ui(ti) = E [1 [b′′i  t−i]]
(
W i(b
′′
i , ti, β)− b′′i
)− E [1 [b′i  t−i]] (W i(b′i, ti, β)− b′i)
+E [1 [b′′i 6 t−i]]Li(b′′i , ti, β)− E [1 [b′i 6 t−i]]Li(b′i, ti, β).
14 Proposition 2 extends Lemma 1 of Garratt, Tro¨ger and Zheng [3] to the ex post perspective.
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Differentiate this equation with respect to ti and then plug into the right-hand side the
envelope equations (16) and (17) and the equations (14) and (15) for Q and q to obtain
∂
∂ti
∆Ui(ti) = E [1 [b′′i  t−i]Qi(b′′i , ti, t−i, β)− 1 [b′i  t−i]Qi(b′i, ti, t−i, β)]
+E [1 [b′′i 6 t−i] qi(ti, t−i, β)− 1 [b′i 6 t−i] qi(ti, t−i, β)] .
The right-hand side, after rearrangements, with notation β suppressed, is equal to
E [1 [b′i  t−i] (Qi(b′′i , ti, t−i)−Qi(b′i, ti, t−i))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:X
+E [1 [b′i 6 t−i, b′′i  t−i] (Qi(b′′i , ti, t−i)− qi(ti, t−i))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Y
.
For any t−i at which the indicator function inside the integralX is nonzero, b′i ≥ maxj 6=i βj(tj)
and hence Proposition 1 applies; for any t−i at which the indicator inside Y is nonzero,
b′′i ≥ maxj 6=i βj(tj) and hence Proposition 2 applies. Thus, both X and Y are nonnegative.
Hence ∂
∂ti
∆Ui(ti) ≥ 0 for any ti interior to Ti. This, coupled with the fact that ∆Ui(ti) is
absolutely continuous in ti (since Ui by Eq. (18) is a linear combination of W i and Li, each
absolutely continuous in ti by Lemma 5), implies the monotonicity of ∆Ui. 
5 Equilibria of the Approximation Games
Based on Theorem 1, if the bid spaces in the initial auction are replaced by some discrete
spaces, a monotone equilibrium exists. To obtain equilibrium in the original game, we shall
prove that the equilibrium property of such approximation equilibria is passed onto the limit
when the discrete bid spaces converge to the original one. A critical step of the proof is to
show that ties occur with zero probability at the limit (Theorem 2). As explained in the
Introduction, our no-tie argument is significantly different from that in the literature.
5.1 The Approximation Games
For any m = 1, 2, . . ., define an m-approximation game by replacing for any bidder i the
space Bi of serious bids with a discrete set B
m
i such that
i 6= j =⇒ Bmi ∩Bmj = ∅, (19)
m < m′ =⇒ Bmi ⊆ Bm′i , (20)
min {|bi − b′i| : bi, b′i ∈ Bmi ; bi 6= b′i} = 2−m, (21)
limm→∞minBmi = r, limm→∞ supB
m
i =∞.
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The main condition is Eq. (19), which ensures that, in anym-approximation game, a bidder’s
serious bid is never an atom of a rival’s bid function.15 Consequently,
(i, bi)  (βk(tk))k∈I\{i} ⇐⇒ bi > max
j 6=i
βj(tj), (22)
hence a bidder’s winning event is simplified. Another consequence is that the posterior
virtual utility functions are simplified to Eq. (4) due to Lemma 2.a.i.
For any m = 1, 2, . . . ,, a profile (βmi )i∈I of functions β
m
i : Ti → {l} ∪ Bmi is an m-
equilibrium if and only if, for any bidder i and any ti ∈ Ti,
∀bmi ∈ Bmi ∪ {l} : Ui(βmi (ti), ti, βm) ≥ Ui(bmi , ti, βm). (23)
If, in addition, βmi is weakly increasing for every i, then the m-equilibrium is said mono-
tone. The next proposition follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem applied to each
m-approximation game based on the single-crossing property implied by Theorem 1. The
proof is the same as Athey’s [1, Theorem 1] and hence omitted.
Proposition 3 For any m = 1, 2, . . ., there exists a monotone m-equilibrium.
By revealed preference, at any m-equilibrium a bidder never bids more than his ex-
pected payoff as a winner if he stands a positive probability of winning:
Lemma 6 For any m = 1, 2, . . ., if (βmi )i∈I is an m-equilibrium then for any i ∈ I and any
ti ∈ Ti such that Pr {βmi (ti) > maxk 6=i βmk (tk)} > 0, we have W i (βmi (ti), ti, βm)−βmi (ti) ≥ 0.
Proof Applying Ineq. (23) to the case bmi = l and using Eqs. (10) and (22), we have
Pr
{
βmi (ti) > max
k 6=i
βmk (tk)
}(
W i (β
m
i (ti), ti, β
m)− βmi (ti)− Li (βmi (ti), ti, βm)
) ≥ 0.
By the hypothesis Pr {βmi (ti) > maxk 6=i βmk (tk)} > 0, the term in the bracket “(· · · )” is
nonnegative. Then the conclusion of the lemma follows from Li (β
m
i (ti), ti, β
m) ≥ 0, which
is true because i can choose not to participate in the resale mechanism.
15 Our approximation game is similar to that of Reny and Zamir [16]; they required the nonoverlapping
condition (19) because their single crossing condition is not guaranteed at atomic bids. While single crossing
condition holds even for atoms here by Theorem 1, we require (19) for the resale continuation game to be
well-behaved, which would be a nonissue in the no-resale model of Reny and Zamir.
Not needed here is the other perturbation devised by Athey [1] and adopted by Reny and Zamir, that a
bidder has to submit the losing bid l when his type belongs to [0, 1/m). They need the perturbation to ensure
a revealed-preference result. It would be redundant in this paper because our revealed-preference result is
ensured by an upcoming notion of consequentiality, which is needed anyway for our no-tie argument.
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5.2 Impossibility of Ties at the Limit
Given a monotone profile β of bid functions, call a serious bid b∗ consequential if Pr{βk(tk) ≤
b∗} > 0 for every bidder k ∈ I, and inconsequential if otherwise. A tie of β means a serious
bid that is an atom for at least two distinct bidders according to their bid functions in β.
Theorem 2 (no tie) If a sequence (βm)∞m=1 of monotone m-equilibria converges pointwise
almost everywhere to a monotone profile β∗, then β∗ admits no consequential tie.
To prove Theorem 2, suppose to the contrary that β∗ admits a consequential tie b∗.
We shall derive a contradiction to the equilibrium property of the sequence (βm)∞m=1. As
a preliminary, the next lemma provides a minute picture of the cluster of rivaling bids
collapsing to the atom b∗ as m→∞.
Lemma 7 If a sequence (βm)∞m=1 of monotone profiles converges pointwise a.e. to a mono-
tone profile β∗ and if J is the set of bidders such that a serious bid b∗ is an atom of β∗j for
all j ∈ J , then there exist subsequence (βmn)∞n=1 and sequence (δn)∞n=1 → 0 such that, with
ai := sup {ti ∈ Ti : β∗i (ti) < b∗} , (24)
zi := sup {ti ∈ Ti : β∗i (ti) ≤ b∗} , (25)
ani := inf {ti ∈ Ti : βmni (ti) > b∗ − δn} , (26)
zni := sup {ti ∈ Ti : βmni (ti) < b∗ + δn} (27)
for each i, we have:
∀i ∈ J : ∀ti ∈ (ani , zni ) : b∗ − δn < βmni (ti) < b∗ + δn, (28)
∀i ∈ J : limn→∞ Pr {ti ∈ Ti \ (ani , zni ) : b∗ + δn ≤ βmni (ti) ≤ b∗ + δn + 2−mn} = 0, (29)
∀i ∈ I : ai = limn→∞ ani , zi = limn→∞ zni , (30)
∀k /∈ J : limn→∞ Pr {tk ∈ Tk : b∗ − δn ≤ βmnk (tk) ≤ b∗ + δn + 2−mn} = 0. (31)
Proof Appendix E.1.
With the (δn)
∞
n=1 in Lemma 7, the collapsing interval (b∗ − δn, b∗ + δn) is the range
of the βmn-bids for those types of bidder i in (ani , z
n
i ), says Ineq. (28). Along the subse-
quence (βmn)∞n=1, Eq. (29) says that the probability with which the types outside (a
n
i , z
n
i )
would bid within (b∗ − δn, b∗ + δn) vanishes, Eq. (30) says that (ani , zni ) converges to (ai, zi),
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and Eq. (31) says that if β∗k has no atom at b∗ then the probability with which player k bids
in (b∗ − δn, bni ), with bni being any bidder i’s lowest grid point above b∗ + δn, goes to zero.
Given the subsequence (βmn)∞n=1 identified in Lemma 7, for each n denote
β¯n := βmn .
By Eq. (31) and the consequentiality of b∗, we have
∀k /∈ J : lim
n→∞
Pr
{
β¯nk (tk) < b∗ − δn
}
> 0. (32)
For any n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, any i, any tni ∈ Ti and any bids bni and cni in Bmni with bni > cni ,
the expected-payoff difference for a type-tni bidder i caused by his bid increase from c
n
i to b
n
i
in the mn-equilibrium β
mn is
∆Uni (t
n
i ) := Ui(b
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n)− Ui(cni , tni , β¯n). (33)
To prove Theorem 2 by contradiction, it suffices to find a bidder i and a sequence (tni , c
n
i , b
n
i )
∞
n=1
such that lim supn∆U
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0 and, for any sufficiently large n, the β¯
n
i -inverse-image of c
n
i
is nondegenerate and contains tni . Then for all sufficiently large n, ∆U
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0 and,
with ∆Uni (·) continuous (Lemma 5), the strict inequality extends to a neighborhood of tni ,
which contradicts the fact that β¯n constitutes an mn-equilibrium.
To this end, decompose ∆Uni (t
n
i ) into three parts (proved in Appendix E.2):
∆Uni (t
n
i ) = ∆W
n
i (t
n
i )−∆bn +∆Πni (tni ), (34)
where
∆W ni (t
n
i ) := Pr
{
bni > max
k 6=i
β¯nk (tk)
}(
W i(b
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n)−W i(cni , tni , β¯n)
)
, (35)
∆bn := (bni − cni ) Pr
{
bni > max
k 6=i
β¯nk (tk)
}
,
∆Πni (t
n
i ) := Pr
{
bni > max
k 6=i
β¯nk (tk) > c
n
i
}(
W i(c
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n)− cni − Lni (tni )
)
, (36)
L
n
i (t
n
i ) := E
[
Li(t−i | tni , β¯n)
∣∣∣∣bni > maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) > cni
]
.
Eq. (34) says that ∆Uni (t
n
i ) consists of the revenue effect ∆W
n
i (t
n
i ), payment effect ∆b
n, and
pivotal effect ∆Πni (t
n
i ), which includes L
n
i (t
n
i ), the winner’s curse in our context.
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5.2.1 Step 1: Locating a Deviant Bidder
Recall the set J of tying rivals specified in Lemma 7. Pick an element j ∈ J such that
∀k ∈ J : aj ≤ ak. (37)
With Bmnj discrete, there exists
cnj := min
{
β¯nj (tj) : tj ∈
(
anj , z
n
j
)}
. (38)
Lemma 8 limn→∞ Pr
{
cnj < maxk∈J\{j} β¯
n
k (tk) ≤ b∗ + δn
}
= 0.
Lemma 8 is proved in Appendix E.3. It can be understood from the viewpoint of those
types of bidder j nearby aj. If the lemma were not true, there would be a mass of rivaling
bids within (b∗ − δn, b∗ + δn) that outbid such types of bidder j, and the mass would not
vanish along the sequence of the approximation equilibria. On one hand, with valuation
nearly equal to aj and with Ineq. (37), such types of bidder j would have almost zero gain
from buying the good from these rival-types at resale, i.e., the winner’s curse for such types
of bidder j to jump over these rival-types is negligible. On the other hand, if such a low-
value bidder j outbids these rival-types, he would profit from reselling to them, again due to
Ineq. (37); with the mass of these rival-types nonvanishing, this expected profit is bounded
away from zero. Both sides considered, bidder j with types nearby aj would deviate to a bid
slightly above (b∗ − δn, b∗ + δn) if Lemma 8 does not hold.
For any n = 1, 2, . . . and any i ∈ J \ {j}, with cnj defined in Eq. (38), let
cni := max
{
β¯ni (ti) : ti ∈
[
0,
(
β¯n
)−1
i,inf
(cnj )
)}
. (39)
For any sufficiently large n,
[
0,
(
β¯n
)−1
i,inf
(cnj )
)
6= ∅ due to Lemma 8 and the hypothesis
that b∗ is consequential; with Bmni discrete, c
n
i exists.
Since J \ {j} is finite, there exists i ∈ J \ {j} with cnγi = maxk∈J\{j} cnγk for all γ in an
infinite subsequence (nγ)
∞
γ=1. For this i, limγ→∞ Pr
{
c
nγ
i < maxk∈J\{j,i} β¯
nγ
k (tk) < c
nγ
j
}
= 0.
Combining this with Lemma 8 and Eq. (39) and relabeling subsequence (nγ)
∞
γ=1, we have
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
cni < max
k∈J\{j}
β¯nk (tk) < b∗ + δn
}
= 0. (40)
Thus, as n→∞, the mn-equilibrium bids from all players other than bidder j vanish from
(cni , b∗ + δn). By c
n
i < c
n
j , the interval (c
n
i , b∗ + δn) is almost exclusively occupied by the bids
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from bidder j with types in (anj , z
n
j ), which converges to the nondegenerate (aj, zj) since b∗
is an atom of β∗j . This coupled with Eq. (32) (consequentiality of b∗) implies
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
cni < max
k∈I\{i}
β¯nk (tk) < b∗ + δn
}
> 0. (41)
By construction, cni < c
n
j < b∗ + δn; by Eq. (40), the mass of i’s bids in (c
n
i , b∗ + δn)
vanishes while, with i ∈ J , a nonvanishing mass of i’s bids remains in (b∗−δn, b∗+δn). Thus,
for all large n, cni > b∗ − δn and hence
b∗ − δn < cni < cnj < b∗ + δn. (42)
By Eq. (39), the β¯ni -inverse-image of c
n
i is nondegenerate. To complete the proof by con-
tradiction, it suffices to prove existence of a sequence (tni )
∞
n=1 such that each t
n
i belongs to
this inverse image and lim supn∆U
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0, with ∆U
n
i (t
n
i ) the expected-payoff difference
rendered by the deviation from cni to
bni := min {bi ∈ Bmni : bi ≥ b∗ + δn} . (43)
To this end, we calculate the three components of ∆Uni (t
n
i ) according to Eq. (34).
Among them, the payment effect ∆bn is O(δn) (hence O(1/n) by Lemma 7) because of
Ineq. (42) and bni − cni ≤ 2mn + b∗ + δn − cni , which follows directly from Eq. (43). Thus, we
need only to calculate the revenue effect ∆W ni (t
n
i ) and pivotal effect ∆Π
n
i (t
n
i ).
5.2.2 Step 2: The Revenue Effect of the Deviation
By a revealed-preference argument, one can prove ∆W ni ≥ 0 (Proposition 4, Appendix A.1.2).
The next lemma asserts further that the revenue effect is bounded away from zero if bidder i
has potential gain of trade with his rivals when he wins with the higher bid.
Lemma 9 If tni →n ti such that 0 < ti < maxk 6=i zk, then lim supn→∞∆W ni (tni ) > 0.
Proof Appendix E.5.
By Eq. (30), zk is the limit of the supremum z
n
k of bidder k’s types that bid below b
n
i in
the mn-equilibrium. Hence the condition “t
n
i →n ti such that ti < maxk 6=i zk” implies that,
for all approximation equilibria sufficiently far along the sequence, bidder i can profit from
reselling the good to his rivals if he wins with the bid bni . By Eq. (41), the mass of rival-types
surpassed by the bid increase does not vanish along the sequence. Hence the bid increase
brings about a nonvainishing increase of resale probability and expected revenue.
22
5.2.3 Step 3: Pivotal Effect Case One: Bypassing the Middleman
Two cases need to be considered on the pivotal effect ∆Πni (t
n
i ). In the first case, bidder i’s
type is so high that, in the event of tying at b∗ and he loses to bidder j, he buys the good
nearly for sure from bidder j. Essentially a middleman, bidder j charges this type of i a price
markup in addition to the period-one price. In making the bid increase thereby surpassing j,
bidder i avoids paying the price markup, which constitutes the pivotal effect in this case.
More precisely, for any k ∈ I and any x ∈ Tk, define
Vk,x(tk) :=
 tk − (Fk(x)− Fk(tk))/fk(tk) if 0 ≤ tk ≤ xx if tk ≥ x. (44)
By Lemma 21 (Appendix E.4, due to Eq. (40)), when bidder j wins with a bid in the
collapsing (cnj , b∗ + δn), every losing bidder k’s posterior virtual utility function converges
to Vk,zk as n→∞. Hence the precise meaning of our first case is that at the limit bidder i
outranks everyone else in terms of (Vk,zk)k 6=j, as hypothesized in the next lemma.
Lemma 10 If tni →n ti such that Vi,zi(ti) ≥ maxk 6=i zk, then limn→∞∆Πni (tni ) > 0.
Proof Appendix E.6.
Since the types of j that bid in (cnj , b∗ + δn) would nearly for sure resell the good to
bidder i when i’s type happens to satisfy the hypothesis of the lemma, the expected payment
extracted from such a high type of bidder i is larger than j’s expected resale revenue by a
nonvanishing margin, as i could be of low types according to j’s posterior belief (Lemma 17,
Appendix A.1.1). With j’s expected resale revenue never below his period-one winning bid
(Lemma 6), this nonvanishing margin implies a nonvanishing markup between the current
price of the good and the expected resale price that the reseller j would impose on the
high-type bidder i. This markup constitutes the pivotal effect of the bid increase.
5.2.4 Step 4: Pivotal Effect Case Two: Becoming the Middleman
Here comes the other case, where bidder i’s type is not high enough to nearly for sure buy
the good at resale from bidder j. Different than the previous case, the current price of the
good could be higher than the resale price that j would charge i at resale in the event that
bidder i’s deviation is pivotal: Even if the revenue extracted from i is less than what j pays
at period one, j can still profit from the revenues extracted from the other potential buyers,
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who are pressured to bid high given i’s presence at resale.16 Then the deviant bidder i suffers
a winner’s curse in the magnitude of the period-one price minus the lower price at resale.
The solution is to turn the table: In the same way that j’s loss from dealing with i is
balanced by j’s revenues extracted from other bidders, i’s winner’s curse can be balanced by
the revenues from the same clientele if i becomes the reseller instead of j. Denote
Ωni :=
{
t−i ∈ T−i : max
k/∈{i,j}
β¯nk (tk) < b
n
i ; c
n
i < β¯
n
j (tj) < b
n
i
}
, (45)
ψni (t
n
i ) := W i
(
cni , t
n
i , β¯
n
)− cni − E [Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | Ωni ] . (46)
Hence Ωni is the pivotal event of i’s bid increase, and ψ
n
i (t
n
i ) his expected payoff from winning
minus his winning bid and minus his winner’s curse.
Lemma 11 If β¯ni (t
n
i ) = c
n
i for each n and (t
n
i )
∞
n=1 converges, then
lim
n→∞
ψni (t
n
i ) ≥ lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
] (
Wj
(
tni , t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)− β¯nj (tj))∣∣Ωni ] . (47)
Proof Appendix E.7.
Lemma 12 There exists a sequence (tni )
∞
n=1 such that β¯
n
i (t
n
i ) = c
n
i for each n and
lim sup
n→∞
E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
] (
Wj
(
tni , t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)− β¯nj (tj))∣∣Ωni ] ≥ 0. (48)
Proof Appendix E.8.
To explain the two lemmas, let us temporarily pretend that, when j’s bid is clustered
around the tie, bidder i somehow knows exactly what j’s bid bj is equal to. Consider a
resale mechanism Mn that i could offer if he wins at period one: First, i announces his
own type tni and then asks bidder j whether t
n
i is above the reserve price that j would have
16 For example, suppose that in the continuation game where bidder j is the reseller, tj = 2, ti is uniformly
distributed on [0, 4], and tk uniformly distributed on [0, 10]. In j’s optimal resale mechanism, the maximum
of bidder i’s expected payment (when ti = 4) is equal to
6
10
× 3 +
∫ 7
6
(tk − 3)dtk/10 = 2.15,
while the reseller j’s expected payoff equals
3
4
× 6
10
× 2 + 1
4
× 6
10
× 3 + 3
4
× 4
10
× 6 +
∫ 4
3
∫ 10
ti+3
(ti + 3)
dtk
10
dti
4
+
∫ 7
6
∫ 4
tk−3
(tk − 3)dti4
dtk
10
≈ 3.76.
Thus, at period one, it is possible for bidder j to submit a bid strictly between 2.15 and 3.76.
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offered i had j been the winner, which implies that j would always resell the good had j
won. If bidder j says No, then i offers resale to all bidders via the Myerson auction that i
should have chosen on the β¯n-equilibrium path. If bidder j answers Yes, by contrast, i offers
resale to all but bidder j via j’s resale mechanism, where i’s own announced type, together
with the losing bidders’, are discounted to their virtual utilities. Here i can replicate j’s
resale mechanism because of our temporary assumption that i knows j’s bid bj. Reseller i’s
uncertainty about j’s type makes no difference, because i excludes j in this case.
While the mechanism Mn is suboptimal to i, it generates enough expected revenue to
cover the winner’s curse and winning bid. To see why, note that the winner’s curse is null
if bidder j, presumed honest, answers No to i’s question. In that case, bidder i’s net gain
is just his expected revenue as a reseller minus his winning bid. Since his resale mechanism
in that case coincides with the Myerson auction that he should have chosen on path, the
expected revenue it generates is the same as his on-path expected revenue, which can cover
the winning bid by a revealed-preference argument (Lemma 6).
Thus, consider the case where bidder j answers Yes to i’s question. In that case, i’s
resale mechanism Mn either keeps the good to i himself or resells the good to some bidder k
other than j. Similarly, had bidder i lost to j at period one then j would resell the good to
either bidder i or some other losing bidder k but would never keep the good to j herself. The
events for these final outcomes are identical betweenMn and j’s resale mechanism, since the
two mechanisms coincide when j honestly answers Yes. Let us calculate i’s gain and loss
from outbidding j in these two events:
final owner gain foregone trade with j current price net gain
i i’s use value tni t
n
i − pnij cni pnij − cni
k pnki 0 c
n
i p
n
ki − cni
Here pnij denotes the resale price that i would need to pay j had j won, and p
n
ki the resale
price at which k buys from i in Mn. Since Mn replicates j’s resale mechanism, pnki = p
n
kj.
Thus, whether the final owner is i himself or some k /∈ {i, j}, i’s net gain from outbidding j
is nearly the same as j’s profit had j won (with cni ≈ b∗ ≈ bj), which is nonnegative by a
revealed-preference argument for bidder j.
In sum, whether j answers Yes or No to i’s question, i’s payoff from outbidding j can
nearly offset the winner’s curse (foregone gain of buying from j) and the current price.
This is the combined implication of Ineqs. (47) and (48), where the indicator function
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1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
]
corresponds to j’s affirmative answer.
Two problems in the above heuristic argument need to be repaired. First, the argument
was based on a false assumption that i somehow knows j’s bid β¯nj (tj). However, removing
this assumption does not upset our conclusion. By Eq. (40), when i’s bid increase is pivotal,
bidder j’s bid β¯nj (tj) ranges in the interval (c
n
i , b∗+δn) where the others rarely bid, hence the
resale mechanism selected by j as a reseller stays mostly constant. Therefore, i can nearly
replicate j’s mechanism with the pretended winning bid bj being any element in this interval.
The second problem is that each player accounts its own profits and loss based on its
private information, hence nonnegative expected profit from j’s viewpoint need not imply
nonnegative expected profit conditional on the realized type of bidder i. Lemma 12 solves
this problem by observing that there exist types tni of bidder i conditional on which j’s
expected profit is nonnegative. In order for such tni to be those whose β¯
n
i -bids equal c
n
i ,
essentially the highest among i’s bids that belong to the tying cluster, we need such tni to
exist at the high end of bidder i’s posterior support. That is ensured by comparative statics
of the Myerson auction (Lemma 19, Appendix A.2.2).
5.2.5 Step 5: Completing the Proof of Theorem 2
There are only two possible cases: either (i) zi < maxk 6=i zk or (ii) zi ≥ maxk 6=i zk.
In Case (i), by Lemma 12, there exists a sequence (tni )
∞
n=1 such that β¯
n
i (t
n
i ) = c
n
i for
each n and Ineq. (48) holds. Extracting a converging subsequence if necessary, we may
assume without loss of generality that tni →n ti for some ti. Then Lemma 11 says that
Ineq. (47) holds. Combining both inequalities we have
lim sup
n→∞
∆Πni (t
n
i ) = lim sup
n→∞
Pr(Ωni ) lim sup
n→∞
ψni (t
n
i ) ≥ 0. (49)
For any n, with cni < b∗ + δn by Ineq. (42), t
n
i ≤ zni . Hence ti ≤ zi < maxk 6=i zk. Thus,
Lemma 9 implies lim supn→∞∆W
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0. Plugging into Eq. (34) this strict inequality, as
well as Ineq. (42) and Eq. (49), we have lim supn→∞∆U
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0.
In Case (ii), where zi ≥ maxk 6=i zk, Lemma 10 implies that limn→∞∆Πni (zi) > 0.
Plugging this into Eq. (34) and noting ∆W ni (zi) ≥ 0 (Proposition 4, Appendix A.1.2) and
Eq. (42), we obtain limn→∞∆Uni (zi) > 0. With ∆U
n
i (ti) continuous in ti (Lemma 5),
there exists α < zi such that limn→∞∆Uni (t
′
i) > 0 for all t
′
i ∈ (α, zi]. By Eq. (40), the
distance between zni and the supremum of the inverse image
(
β¯n
)−1
i
(cni ) converges to zero;
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thus, with zni →n zi by Eq. (30), this supremum converges to zi. Hence we can pick a
sequence (tni )
∞
n=1 such that t
n
i ∈
(
β¯n
)−1
i
(cni ) for each n and t
n
i →n zi. Then for all sufficiently
large n, tni ∈ (α, zi] and hence lim supn→∞∆Uni (tni ) > 0. Therefore, the desired contradiction
lim supn→∞∆U
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0 is obtained, which completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Slightly modifying the construction of cni , we can extend the above proof to obtain—
Corollary 1 If b∗ > r then b∗ is not a consequential atom of β∗.
Proof Appendix E.9.
6 Payoff Security at the Limit
Recall our objective of showing that Ineq. (23) converges to the equilibrium condition for the
limit profile β∗, i.e., Ui(β∗i (ti), ti, β
∗) ≥ Ui(bi, ti, β∗) for all possible bids bi. While Theorem 2
has ensured that the left-hand side of (23) does converge to Ui(β
∗
i (ti), ti, β
∗) for almost
every ti (since the probability which which β
mn
i (ti) converges to an atom of β
∗
−i is zero),
one would still wish to show that for any bid bi, Ui(bi, ti, β
∗) is the limit of a sequence
of (Ui(b
m
i , ti, β
∗))∞m=1 such that each b
m
i is an unchosen option for i in the approximation
equilibrium βm. But such convergence is impeded by a case where bi is an atom of β
∗. In
that case, even if there is a sequence (bmi )
∞
m=1 → bi each of which is an admissible bid in
the corresponding m-approximation game, the right-hand side of (23) still does not converge
to the discontinuous point Ui(bi, ti, β
∗). In the fixed-point literature, this problem is solved
by a payoff-security condition saying that bidder i can do nearly as well by bidding slightly
above the atom bi. This condition, however, relies on a monotonicity assumption that may
fail with resale, as explained in the Introduction.
Our solution is a payoff-security theorem saying that a bidder, instead of bidding at an
atom, can do nearly as well by either abstention or bidding slightly above the atom. This
is nontrivial because being hurt from bidding above an atom does not automatically imply
that bidding below it does not hurt. For instance, say the reserve price r is an atom of a
bidder j 6= i and bidder i’s type is way above r so that i gets a big positive payoff if i wins
by bidding the atom r. Suppose that there is a large probability with which all bidders other
than i submit the losing bid l, so that if i bids below r (by submitting l) then he gets zero
payoff with a large probability, rendering him worse-off than bidding at the atom r. On the
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other hand, bidding above r may also be worse-off when i expects a large gain from buying
the good at resale from the r-bidding types of j.
Theorem 3 (payoff security) If a sequence (βm)∞m=1 of monotone m-equilibria converges
pointwise a.e. to a monotone profile β∗, then for any bidder i, any ti ∈ Ti and any atom b∗
of β∗−i, either (i) Ui(l, ti, β
∗) ≥ Ui(b∗, ti, β∗) or (ii) limn→∞ Ui(bn, ti, β∗) ≥ Ui(b∗, ti, β∗) for
any sequence (bn)∞n=1 such that b
n ↓ b∗ and none in the sequence is an atom of β∗.
The proof of the theorem is facilitated by some comparative static properties of the
Myerson resale auction and a general feature of Theorem 1, which asserts an increase dif-
ference result that allows for atoms. A main part of the proof is illustrated by Figure 2,
0 r aj
W i(r,ti,β
∗)<r W i(r,ti,β∗)≥r
r
ti, tj
bid
β∗j
t′i t
′′
i
Figure 2: Proving the payoff-security theorem
where the reserve price r is a consequential atom for bidder j and j only. This atom cannot
be ruled out in the manner of the no-tie theorem, because anyone else who bids below r
submits l, bounded away from r, would suffer a significant increase of payments in jumping
up to r or above. To prove payoff security in this case, we first observe that aj, the infimum
of bidder j’s r-bidding types, cannot fall below the reserve price:
Lemma 13 If r is a consequential atom of β∗j then inf{tj : β∗j (tj) = r} ≥ r.
Proved in Appendix F.1, Lemma 13 can be understood from the viewpoint of the
type aj of bidder j. If, contrary to the lemma, aj < r, then aj pays a price r above his
use value and hence needs to recover the loss from resale revenues. For that to happen,
he needs some other bidders to abstain from the initial auction up to a type above r in
the m-equilibria with large m. Then the supremum zi among such abstaining types would
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deviate to a bid slightly above r: While the deviation increases his payment from zero to r,
the cost is more than outweighed by the saved resale price charged by j.
By Lemma 13, one can show that there exist types of bidder i, such as the t′′i in Figure 2,
for which t′′i ≤ aj and the expected payoff W i(r, t′′i , β∗) from winning at price r does not fall
below r. Payoff security for such t′′i is at hand: Instead of bidding at the atom r, t
′′
i can bid
slightly above r. With t′′i ≤ aj, the winner’s curse rendered by this bid increase is negligible,
as in Lemma 8. Coupled with the fact W i(r, t
′′
i , β
∗) ≥ r, this implies nearly nonnegative
pivotal effect. Thus, the expected-payoff difference caused by this slight increase of bids is
nearly nonnegative provided that the revenue effect is also nearly nonnegative. Then our
increasing difference theorem implies that the expected-payoff difference cannot become more
negative when t′′i becomes higher, even if high enough to cause a large winner’s curse. The
other case, where i’s type falls down to say t′i in Figure 2, is easy. There, W i(r, t
′
i, β
∗) < r
and one readily sees that the type t′i would rather submit the losing bid l than r. Payoff
security with respect to r is hence established for all types of i.
In the above reasoning, the only gap to fill is the claim that the revenue effect of the
bid increase is nearly nonnegative, as asserted by the next lemma. It is a nontrivial fact
because the lower bid r here is an atom, rendering the resale environment partially irregular
for a reseller who won after bidding r, which Appendix A.2 handles in detail.
Lemma 14 For any monotone profile β, if b is an atom of βj and βj only and if (b
n)∞n=1
converges to b from above and none in the sequence is an atoms of β, then for any bidder i 6= j
and any ti ∈ Ti, limn→∞W i(bn, ti, β) ≥ W i(b, ti, β).
Proof By definition, W i(b, ti, β) is i’s optimal expected payoff as a winner based on the
posteriors (Fk(· | i, b, β))k 6=i defined by Eq. (68), which is a semi-regular resale environment
defined in §A.2 due to b being an atom of βj. Thus, W i(b, ti, β) = Φ(0, ti∗), where Φ
is defined in Eq. (62), with
(
i, j, β−1j,inf(b), β
−1
j,sup(b)
)
playing the role (i∗, i, αi, ζi) there. By
contrast, W i(b
n, ti, β) is i’s expected payoff as a winner when his winning bid b
n avoids
the atoms of β−i, which constitutes a regular resale environment defined in §A.1. For each
potential buyer k 6= i, when bn ↓ b, the supremum of the support of tk converges to β−1k,sup(b)
and the posterior distribution converges to the regular Fk,β−1k,sup(b)
defined in Eq. (50). Thus,
lim
n→∞
W i(b
n, ti, β) =
∫ β−1j,sup(b)
0
ϕj(tj, ti)Fj,β−1j,sup(b)(dtj).
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Then the lemma follows from Corollary 4.
The other case that needs handling in the proof of the theorem is that the atom is
inconsequential. In this case, if our bidder i cannot unilaterally alter the inconsequentiality
of the atom, then the atom is effectively the same as the losing bid l and payoff security
for i follows. By contrast, if an atom b∗ is inconsequential only because i’s β∗i -bid is above b∗
almost surely, then when i bids b∗ instead of abiding by β∗i , the bid b∗ would have positive
winning probability and cause possible discontinuity in i’s expected payoff. This possibility
is eliminated by the next lemma.
Lemma 15 If a serious bid b∗ is an inconsequential atom of β∗ then there are at least two
bidders such that, for each k of the two, b∗ is not an atom of β∗k and Pr{β∗k(tk) > b∗} = 1.
The proof, in Appendix F.2, is similar in spirit to that of Lemma 10: If bidder i is the
only one who bids above the atom almost surely, then in some m-equilibria with sufficiently
large m, there would be sufficiently high types of a bidder j who would almost always
outrank his rivals in the resale mechanism offered by those types of bidder i who would
have won without j’s deviation. These types of i, if undefeated, act merely as middlemen
for j and impose on j a price markup (Lemma 17, Appendix A.1.1), which bidder j could
have bypassed with a higher bid. Different from Lemma 10, however, these types of bidder i
do not constitute a nonvanishing mass. Therefore, much of the proof of the lemma is to
fine-tune the magnitude of j’s deviation so that his expected net gain is strictly positive.
Proof of Theorem 3 The atom b∗ is either consequential or not. First, suppose that it
is consequential. Then, by Corollary 1, b∗ = r and it is the atom of only one bidder, say j.
Furthermore, by Lemma 13, aj := inf
{
tj : β
∗
j (tj) = r
} ≥ r. Pick any i 6= j and let
Ai :=
{
ti ∈ Ti : W i(r, ti, β∗)− r < 0
}
.
By monotonicity and continuity of W i(r, ·, β∗) (the envelope equation in Lemma 5), Ai is an
interval starting from zero and ends at supAi, and W i(r, ti, β
∗) − r ≥ 0 for all ti ≥ supA.
Furthermore, with the facts W i(r, ti, β
∗) ≥ ti and aj ≥ r, we have supAi ≤ r ≤ aj.
For any ti < supAi, W i(r, ti, β
∗) − r < 0 impies, by Li ≥ 0 (individual rationality at
resale) and Eq. (10), that Ui(l, ti, β
∗) > Ui(r, ti, β∗), which is alternative (i) claimed by the
theorem. For any ti ≥ supAi, we prove that alternative (ii) is true. Thus, pick any sequence
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(n)
∞
n=1 ↓ 0 such that for none of n is r+ n an atom of β∗. For each n consider a bid increase
from r to r + n. It suffices to prove that the expected-payoff difference
∆Ui(ti) := Ui(r + n, ti, β
∗)− Ui(r, ti, β∗)
rendered by this bid increase, with others abiding by β∗, is no less than −O(n). We need
only to prove the claim for the case ti = supAi, then Theorem 1 extends the inequality
to all higher types. To prove ∆Ui(supAi) ≥ −O(n), recall the fact supAi ≤ aj proved
above. Thus, in the event that the reseller is bidder j with types tj such that β
∗
j (tj) = r,
tj ≥ aj. Hence the winner’s curse L˜i(supA, r + n, r, β∗) = 0. Coupled with the fact
W i(r, supAi, β
∗)− r ≥ 0, this implies the pivotal effect
∆Πi(supAi) = Pr{pivotal}
(
W i(r, supAi, β
∗)− r − L˜i(supA, r + n, r, β∗)
)
≥ 0.
We also have ∆Wi(supAi) ≥ −O(n), by Lemma 14, and ∆b = O(n). Thus, ∆Ui(supAi) ≥
−O(n) via Eq. (34), as desired.
Second, consider the case where the atom b∗ is inconsequential. By Lemma 15, for the
bidder i 6= j under our consideration, there exists a k 6= i for whom β∗k > b∗ almost surely.
Thus, for bidder i, bidding b∗ loses for sure, same as submitting the losing bid l. Hence
Ui(l, ti, β
∗) ≥ Ui(b∗, ti, β∗) for all ti, which is alternative (i) claimed by the theorem. 
7 Equilibrium of the Original Game
Since the no-tie and payoff-security theorems have essentially resolved the issue of atoms,
to complete the existence proof we need only to demonstrate the convergence of a bidder’s
expected payoff at non-atom bids, asserted by the next lemma.
Lemma 16 For any i ∈ I, any ti ∈ Ti and any sequence (bmi )∞m=1 converging to bi such that
bmi ∈ Bmi for each m, if bi is not an atom of β∗−i then limm→∞ Ui(bmi , ti, βm) = Ui(bi, ti, β∗).
Proved in Appendix G, the lemma is mainly due to the convergence of a bidder’s
expected payoffs at resale, whose convergence is in turn due to the convergence of posterior
virtual utilities when the winning bid is not an atom.
Theorem 4 (existence) For any reserve price r ≥ 0, the auction-resale game defined
in §2.1 admits a monotone perfect Bayesian equilibrium; furthermore, at this equilibrium,
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any bidder’s period-one bid that is above r and can win with strictly positive probability is a
strictly increasing function of the bidder’s use value.
Proof By Proposition 3, there exists a sequence (βm)∞m=1 such that every β
m satisfies
Ineq. (23). Taking a convergent subsequence and relabeling if necessary, we can assume
without loss that βm → β∗ a.e., with β∗i weakly increasing for each bidder i. Corollary 1 says
that the consequential serious bids according to β∗ are strictly increasing in the bidders’ types
except possibly the reserve price. Thus, by Lemma 4, it suffices to show that β∗ constitutes
a Nash equilibrium with respect to the interim expected payoff functions (Ui(·, ·, β∗))i∈I . By
Theorem 2, the left-hand side of Ineq. (23) converges to Ui(β
∗
i (ti), ti, β
∗) for almost every ti.
For any bid bi ∈ {l}∪ [r,∞), we may assume without loss that bi is not an atom of β∗−i. That
is because any atomic bid, by Theorem 3, can be replaced either by l or a sufficiently close
bid b′i that is not one of the at most countably many atoms of β
∗
−i and, by Lemma 16 and
the denseness of ∪mBmi , b′i in turn can be replaced by an element of Bmi that, for sufficiently
large m, is sufficiently close to the atomic bid. With the alternative bid bi not an atom
of β∗−i, there exists a sequence (b
m
i )
∞
m=1 →m bi such that the right-hand side of Ineq. (23)
converges to Ui(bi, ti, β
∗). Then the desired best-reply condition is obtained:
Ui(β
∗
i (ti), ti, β
∗) = lim
m→∞
Ui(β
m
i (ti), ti, β
m) ≥ lim
m→∞
Ui(b
m
i , ti, β
m) = Ui(bi, ti, β
∗). 
8 Conclusion
Fixed-point approaches have been foundational to theoretical investigations of discontinuous
games especially certain auction mechanisms. Incorporation of post-auction resale into such
approaches is not only realistically relevant but also theoretically compelling, because, as
noted in the literature, resources can be misallocated in certain asymmetric auctions, trig-
gering the incentive for resale. The possibility of resale brings about new challenges to the
fixed-point approaches. The value-correlation across bidders, previously assumed exogenous,
becomes endogenously determined by resale, which is itself endogenous. The discontinuity
problem of tying bids gets compounded to the discontinuity of post-auction beliefs and that
of the payoffs at resale. Yet these challenges turn out to be surmountable, as demonstrated
in this paper, which has extended the fixed-point approach beyond its previous confines of
treating an auction as an isolated event.
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To capture its endogenous nature, this paper models resale by assuming that the win-
ning bidder gets to choose any resale mechanism, hence at equilibrium resale is offered
through the Myerson auctions. The extent to which the properties of such resale mecha-
nisms, instrumental to our existence proof, may be generalized to other resale settings is left
for future investigations. Nevertheless, there is a merit, at least for the first endeavor, to en-
dogenize resale mechanisms as in our model. It shows us the power of mechanism design, as a
modeling technique, to pin down resale mechanisms among the myriad of secondary-market
arrangements often hard to observe. Just as the rational choice axiom reduces individual
behaviors to regularity, the endogenous treatment of resale mechanisms generates subtle
comparative statics in equilibrium with forward-looking bidding behaviors.
A Comparative Statics of the Myerson Auction
The properties of Myerson’s [13] optimal auction proved here are mainly about the mono-
tonicity of the seller’s expected payoff with respect to some aspects of the bidder-type dis-
tributions. However intuitive they might sound, these properties are not trivial to prove.
Different from the case in the received literature, monotonicity does not follow from the
affiliation inequalities in Milgrom and Weber [12], because the ex post revenue need not be
nondecreasing in the bidders’ realized types, as explained in the Introduction.
In our context, the Myeson auction corresponds to the equilibrium resale mechanism
selected by a reseller, and the distributions the post-auction beliefs. Let i∗ ∈ I denote this
(re)seller and I\{i∗}. For any i ∈ I\{i∗}, assume, on the support of the prior distribution Fi,
that Fi has strictly positive density fi and the prior virtual utility ti − (1− Fi(ti))/fi(ti) is
strictly increasing in ti.
A.1 Regular Resale Environments
A regular resale environment is characterized by a vector ζ := (ζi)i∈I\{i∗} such that, for any
i ∈ I \ {i∗} the distribution of i’s type ti is an Fi,ζi derived from the prior Fi via
Fi,ζi(ti) := Fi(ti)/Fi(ζi) (50)
for all ti in the support [0, ζi], and likewise for the density fi,ζi . Define the posterior virtual
utility Vi,ζi(ti) by Eq. (44) if ti ≤ ζi and by Vi,ζi(ti) := ζi if ti ≥ ζi. Then Vi,ζi is strictly
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increasing and continuous on [0, ζi]. For any i 6= i∗ and any t−i := (ti∗ , (tk)k/∈{i,i∗}), denote
vi(t−i) := max
{
ti∗ , max
k/∈{i,i∗}
Vk,ζk(tk)
}
. (51)
Let M(ζ, ti∗) denote the Myerson auction defined by (Vk,ζk)k 6=i∗ , which for each realized type
profile (ti∗ , t−i∗) sells only to a bidder k for whom Vk,ζk(tk) ≥ vk(t−k) at price V−1k,ζk (vk(t−k))
and charges everyone else zero price. Denote R(ζ, ti∗ , t−i∗) for seller i∗’s ex post payoff
(“revenue”) generated by mechanism M(ζ, ti∗) when t−i∗ is the realized type profile across
i ∈ I \ {i∗}. Let
R(ζ, ti∗) := E [R(ζ, ti∗ , t−i∗) | t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗ ] ,
where, for any points x and y in the same euclidean space, x 5 y means xk ≤ yk for each
coordinate k, and x 65 y means “not x 5 y”. With every Vk,ζk strictly increasing on [0, ζk],
the seller’s optimization problem belongs to the regular case of Myerson [13]. Thus,
R(ζ, ti∗) = E
[
max
{
ti∗ ,max
k 6=i∗
Vk,ζk(tk)
}∣∣∣∣ t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗] . (52)
A.1.1 An Upper Bound of Expected Revenues
This upper bound is the expected payment made by the highest possible bidder-type.
Lemma 17 If i ∈ I \ {i∗} and ζi = maxk 6=i∗ ζk > ti∗, then
R(ζ, ti∗) < E
[
V−1i,ζi
(
max
{
ti∗ , max
k/∈{i,i∗}
Vk,ζk(tk)
})∣∣∣∣ t−(i,i∗) 5 ζ−(i,i∗)] . (53)
Proof By Eqs. (51) and (52),
R(ζ, ti∗) = E
[
max
{Vi,ζi(ti), vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗))}∣∣ t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗]
= E
[
vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗))1
[
vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) ≥ Vi,ζi(ti)
] | t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:X
+E
[Vi,ζi(ti)1 [vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) < Vi,ζi(ti)] | t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Y
.
First, we calculate X. For any t−i∗ in the integration domain of X, the hypothe-
sis ζi ≥ max{ti∗ ,maxk/∈{i,i∗} ζk} implies vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) ≤ ζi and hence V−1i,ζi(vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗))) ≥
vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)). Furthermore, there is a positive-measure subset of the integration domain in
which this inequality is strict: When t−i∗ is nearly zero so that every bidder’s virtual utility
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is negative, vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) = ti∗ while V−1i,ζi(vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗))) = V−1i,ζi(ti∗), strictly larger than ti∗
by Eq. (44). This subset is of positive measure in T−i∗ since the priors have no gap. Thus,
X < E
[V−1i,ζi(vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)))1 [vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) ≥ Vi,ζi(ti)] | t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗] . (54)
To calculate Y , denote qi(t−i∗) := 1
[
vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) < Vi,ζi(ti)
]
, the probability with
which bidder i buys the good at player i∗’s mechanism M(ζ). Denote
qi(ti) := E
[
qi(ti, t−(i,i∗)) | t−(i,i∗) 5 ζ−(i,i∗)
]
.
By Eq. (44),
Y = E
[(
ti − 1− Fi,ζi(ti)
fi,ζi(ti)
)
qi(ti, t−(i,i∗))
∣∣∣∣ t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗] = ∫ ζi
0
qi(ti)
(
ti − 1− Fi,ζi(ti)
fi,ζi(ti)
)
fi,ζi(ti)dti.
Going through the integration-by-parts routine in reverse order, we have
Y =
∫ ζi
0
tiqi(ti)fi,ζi(ti)dti −
∫ ζi
0
∫ ζi
ti
qi(ti)fi,ζi(t
′
i)dt
′
idti
=
∫ ζi
0
tiqi(ti)fi,ζi(ti)dti −
∫ ζi
0
∫ ti
0
qi(ti)dtifi,ζi(t
′
i)dt
′
i
=
∫ ζi
0
(
tiqi(ti)−
∫ ti
0
qi(ti)dti
)
fi,ζi(ti)dti,
which by the envelope-theorem routine is equal to the ex ante expected payment of type ζi
in player i∗’s mechanism M(ζ) conditional on the event that tk ∈ [0, ζk] for all k 6= i∗. Thus,
by the definition of the payment rule in that mechanism,
Y = E
[V−1i,ζi (vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)))1 [vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) < Vi,ζi(ti)] | t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗] .
This combined with Ineq. (54) gives the desired inequality:
R(ζ, ti∗) < E
[V−1i,ζi (vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗))) | t−i∗ 5 ζ−i∗] = E [V−1i,ζi (vi(ti∗ , t−(i,i∗))) | t−(i,i∗) 5 ζ−(i,i∗)] . 
A.1.2 Monotonicity of Optimal Expected Revenues
With monotone bidding strategies in the initial auction, a higher winning bid implies higher
supremums of the posterior supports of the losing bidders. If the reseller adjusts her resale
mechanism accordingly, the effect on her expected revenues is quantified below.
Proposition 4 If ζ 5 ζ ′ and ζ 6= ζ, then R(ζ, ti∗) ≤ R(ζ ′, ti∗) and:
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a. if maxk 6=i∗ ζk ≤ ti∗ < maxk 6=i∗ ζ ′k, then
R(ζ ′, ti∗)−R(ζ, ti∗) ≥
1− Fk
(
V−1k,ζ′k(ti∗)
)
Fk (ζ ′k))
(V−1k,ζ′k(ti∗)− ti∗) ; (55)
b. if ti∗ < maxk 6=i∗ ζk then
R(ζ ′, ti∗)−R(ζ, ti∗) ≥ γ Pr {∃k ∈ I \ {i∗} : ζk < tk ≤ ζ ′k]} , (56)
where
γ :=
∏
k 6=i Fk (ζk)−
∏
k 6=i Fk
(
min
{V−1k,ζk(ti∗), ζk})(∏
k 6=i Fk (ζ
′
k)
)(∏
k 6=i Fk (ζk)
) ti∗ . (57)
Proof There are only two possible cases: (i) ti∗ ≥ maxk 6=i∗ ζk and (ii) ti∗ < maxk 6=i∗ ζk.
Case (i): ti∗ ≥ maxk 6=i∗ ζk. Then there is no gain of trade and hence R(ζ, ti∗) = ti∗ . By
the fact that R(ζ ′, ti∗) ≥ ti∗ , we have R(ζ ′, ti∗) ≥ R(ζ, ti∗). Now suppose, in addition, that
ti∗ < ζ
′
k for some k 6= i∗, which is the case in Claim (a) of the proposition. Then there is a
strictly positive probability that sale happens at mechanism M(ζ ′, ti∗); in the case of sale,
seller i∗’s payoff is at least as large as the reserve price V−1k,zk(ti∗). Hence Ineq. (55) follows.
Case (ii): ti∗ < maxk 6=i∗ ζk. Note that the mechanism M(ζ, ti∗) is ex post incentive
feasible for any potential buyer k ∈ I \ {i∗}: Conditional on any t−k ∈ T−k, k’s win-
ning probability in M(ζ ′, ti∗) is nondecreasing in tk since k’s virtual utility Vk,ζk(tk) is so,
and k’s payment V−1k,ζk (v(t−k)), denoted pk(t−k) here, satisfies the envelope equation condi-
tional on t−k. Thus, when the support supremums are (ζ ′k)k 6=i∗ instead of (ζk)k 6=i∗ , M(ζ, ti∗)
is still incentive feasible. Hence let R̂(ζ | ζ ′) denote seller i∗’s expected payoff generated
by M(ζ, ti∗) at the truthtelling equilibrium given distributions (Fk,ζ′k)k 6=i∗ . By revealed pref-
erence from i∗’s viewpoint,
R(ζ ′, ti∗)−R(ζ, ti∗) ≥ R̂(ζ | ζ ′)−R(ζ, ti∗). (58)
Denote
A :=
{
t−i ∈ T−i : t−i∗ 5 ζ; ti∗ > max
k 6=i∗
Vk,ζk(tk)
}
,
B :=
{
t−i ∈ T−i : t−i∗ 65 ζ; t−i∗ 5 ζ ′; ti∗ > max
k 6=i
Vk,ζk(tk)
}
,
C := {t−i ∈ T−i : t−i∗ 5 ζ} \ A,
D := {t−i ∈ T−i : t−i∗ 65 ζ; t−i∗ 5 ζ ′} \B.
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Thus, A ∪ C is the support of t−i∗ given ζ; within A ∪ C, A is the event in which i∗ does
not sell the good at mechanism M(ζ, ti∗). Analogously, A∪B ∪C ∪D is the support of t−i∗
given ζ ′, and A ∪B the event of no-sale at mechanism M(ζ, ti∗).
Let pi(A), pi(B), pi(C) and pi(D) denote the prior probabilities of these sets. Since
ti∗ < ζk for some k 6= i in this case, pi(C) > 0 (since Vk,ζk ≤ ζk). Let us compare the
performance of mechanism M(ζ, ti∗) conditional on ζ with its performance conditional ζ ′:
A ∪B C D
probability given ζ pi(A)
pi(A)+pi(C)
pi(C)
pi(A)+pi(C)
0
probability given ζ ′ pi(A)+pi(B)
pi(A)+pi(B)+pi(C)+pi(D)
pi(C)
pi(A)+pi(B)+pi(C)+pi(D)
pi(D)
pi(A)+pi(B)+pi(C)+pi(D)
ex post payoff for i ti∗
∑
j 6=i∗ qji∗(t)pj(t−j)
∑
j 6=i∗ qji∗(t)pj(t−j)
In the cells on the last row and the third and fourth columns, the ex post payoff for seller i∗
is equal to
∑
j 6=i∗ qji∗(t)pj(t−j), where qji∗(t) denotes the probability with which i∗ sells the
good to j in the mechanism M(ζ, ti∗). According to the payment rule in M(ζ, ti∗), this sum
of payments is at least as large as the reserve price V−1j,ζj(ti∗) for any j who wins; this reserve
price is strictly greater than ti∗ as ti∗ < ζ
′
j in this case. Therefore,
R̂(ζ | ζ ′)−R(ζ, ti∗)
> ti∗
(
pi(D)
pi(A) + pi(B) + pi(C) + pi(D)
− 0 + pi(A) + pi(B)
pi(A) + pi(B) + pi(C) + pi(D)
− pi(A)
pi(A) + pi(C)
)
=
pi(C) (pi(B) + pi(D))
(pi(A) + pi(B) + pi(C) + pi(D)) (pi(A) + pi(C))
ti∗ .
which is equal to pi(B) + pi(D) multiplied by the γ defined by Eq. (57). Note that pi(B) +
pi(D) = Pr {∃k ∈ I \ {i∗} : ζk < tk ≤ ζ ′k]}. Thus, Ineq. (58) implies (56).
A.2 Semi-Regular Resale Environments
A semi-regular resale environment is characterized by a vector ζ := (ζk)k∈I\{i∗} and an
i ∈ I \ {i∗} as follows: the distribution of tk for each k ∈ I \ {i, i∗} is the same as in
the regular environment characterized by ζ; for i, however, there is an αi ∈ (0, ζi] and a
pii ∈ (0, 1) such that the distribution of ti is
Fi(ti | αi, ζi) :=

Fi(t)
piiFi(ζi)+(1−pii)Fi(αi) if 0 ≤ ti ≤ αi
piiFi(t)+(1−pii)Fi(αi)
piiFi(ζi)+(1−pii)Fi(αi) if αi ≤ ti ≤ ζi.
(59)
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Thus, while the posterior virtual utility function of each k ∈ I \ {i, i∗} is the same as Vk,ζk
defined in the regular case, the counterpart for player i is the ironed version of—
Vi,αi,ζi(ti) :=
 ti −
piiFi(ζi)+(1−pii)Fi(αi)−Fi(ti)
fi(ti)
if 0 ≤ ti < αi
ti − Fi(ζi)−Fi(ti)fi(ti) if αi < ti ≤ ζi.
(Note that if αi = ζi then Fi(· | αi, ζi) is specialized back to the regular case.) Since
ti − (1 − Fi(ti))/fi(ti) is strictly increasing in ti on the prior support, one can show that
Vi,αi,ζi strictly increases on [0, αi), drops at the point αi, and then strictly increases on
(αi, ζi], attaining to its maximum value ζi at ζi. Let V i,αi,ζi denote the ironed version of Vk,ζk
according to Myerson’s procedure. Denote M(ζ, αi, ti∗) for the Myerson auction in this
environment, given the seller’s realized type ti∗ , and R(ζ, αi, ti∗ , t−i∗) the ex post payoff
for the seller generated by this mechanism when t−i∗ is the realized type profile across all
potential buyers. Note from the definition of Myerson’s auction that, if i wins given profile t−i
of realized types across other players, then i’s payment is equal to
V−1i,αi,ζi(vi(t−i)) := inf
{
ti ∈ [0, ζi] : V i,αi,ζi(ti) ≥ vi(t−i)
}
.
If the mechanism is given to beM(ζ, αi, ti∗), how does a perturbation of bidder i’s type
distribution affect the seller’s expected revenue? Regarding this question two properties are
proved next, where the symbols ζ, αi and ti∗ are suppressed (e.g., Vk means Vk,ζk) unless
clarification is necessary.
A.2.1 Continuity
Given ζ, αi and ti∗ , for any S ⊆
∏
k/∈{i,i∗}[0, ζk] and Pr(S) > 0 and any ti ∈ Ti, define
φ(ti, S) := E
[
R
(
ζ, αi, ti, ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)
) | t−(i,i∗) ∈ S] . (60)
Lemma 18 If S ⊆∏k/∈{i,i∗}[0, ζk] and Pr(S) > 0, then φ(·, S) is continuous on [0, ζi].
Proof Let ζi ≥ x′′ > x′ ≥ 0. Suppose the value of ti increases from x′ to x′′. Given any t−i,
this change affects the seller’s ex post payoff R(ζ, αi, ti, ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)) in only two cases:
Case (i): V i(x′) < vi(t−i) ≤ V i(x′′). Let k∗ be the bidder whose virtual utility is the
highest when ti = x
′. Then, when ti increases from x′ to x′′, the winner in M(ζ, αi, ti∗)
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switches from k∗ to i and the revenue for i∗ changes by an amount bounded by maxk∈I tk.
Note that Case (i) occurs only if V i(x′) < vi(t−i) ≤ V i(x′′), which belongs to the event
⋃
j /∈{i,i∗}
t−(i,i∗) ∈ ∏
k/∈{i,i∗}
[0, ζk] : V i(x′) < max
k/∈{i,i∗}
Vk(tk) = Vj(tj) ≤ V i(x′′)
 .
Case (ii): V i(x′′) < vi(t−i) and V i(x′′) is equal to the second highest among (Vk(tk))k/∈{i,i∗}
and V i(x′′). Let k∗ be the bidder whose virtual utility is the highest when ti = x′′ (hence
also the highest when ti = x
′). When ti increases from x′ to x′′, k∗ remains to be the winner
in M(ζ, αi, ti∗) but her payment according to Eq. (51) increases by the amount
V−1k∗
(V i(x′′))− V−1k∗ (max{ti∗ ,V i(x′), max
k/∈{i,i∗k∗}
Vk(tk)
})
≤ V−1k∗
(V i(x′′))− V−1k∗ (V i(x′)) ,
where V−1k∗ exists and is continuous as Vk∗ is strictly increasing and continuous on [0, ζk∗ ].
Thus, in either case, the difference is in the order of
∣∣V−1k∗ (V i(x′′))− V−1k∗ (V i(x′))∣∣,
which is in the order of |x′′−x′| due to the continuity of V i and V−1k∗ . Thus, |φ(x′′, S)− φ(x′, S)|
is in the order of |x′′ − x′|.
Given (ζn, Sn)∞n=1 such that S
n ⊆∏k/∈{i,i∗} [0, ζnk ] and Pr(Sn) > 0 for each n, define
φn(ti) := E
[
R
(
ζn, ζni , ti, ti∗ , t−(i,i∗)
) | t−(i,i∗) ∈ Sn] .
Corollary 2 If ζn → ζ and Sn → S, then (φn)∞n=1 is equicontinuous at ζi.
Proof Denote the posterior virtual utilities in the environment ζn by Vnk (k /∈ {i, i∗})
and Vni . By the proof of Lemma 18, there exists K > 0 such that for any n and any ti ∈ Ti
|Pr(Sn) (φn(ti)− φn(ζi))| ≤ K
∣∣(Vnk∗)−1 (Vni (ti))− (Vnk∗)−1 (Vni (ζi))∣∣ ≤ (K/λ) ∣∣Vni (ti)− Vni (ζi)∣∣
for some k∗ /∈ {i, i∗}, where the second inequality follows from the fact that the derivative
of the increasing inverse function (Vnk∗)−1 is bounded from above by 1/λ (Lemma 2.a.ii). By
the definition of virtual utilities and the ironing procedure, Vni (ti) = Vni (ti) when ti ↑ ζni and
Vni (ti) = ζni when ti ≥ ζni . Specifically, the right-derivative of Vni at ζni is equal to zero and
the left-derivative of Vni at ζni is
D−Vni (ζni ) = D−Vni (ζni ) = lim
ti↑ζni
(
ζni − ti +
Fi(ζ
n
i )− Fi(ti)
fi(ti)
)
1
ζni − ti
= 2.
Thus, with ζni →n ζ, the left- and right-derivatives of Vni at ζi are bounded between zero
and 2. This being true for all n, we have shown that (φn)∞n=1 is equicontinuous at ζi.
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A.2.2 Monotonicity with Respect to Upward Weight Transfers
Denote, for any θ ∈ [0, ζi] and any ti ∈ Ti,
ϕi(ti, ti∗) := E
[
R
(
ζ, αi, ti∗ , ti, t−(i,i∗)
) | t−(i,i∗) 5 ζ−(i,i∗)] , (61)
Φ(θ, ti∗) :=
1
1− Fi(θ | αi, ζi)
∫ ζi
θ
ϕi(τi, ti∗)Fi(dτi | αi, ζi). (62)
Note that Φ(0, ti∗) is equal to i∗’s expected payoff generated by M(ζ, αi, ti∗) given posterior
distributions
(
(Fk,ζk)k/∈{i,i∗} , Fi(· | αi, ζi)
)
and, given these distributions, is the maximum
expected payoff for the type-ti∗ seller i∗ among all incentive feasible game forms for k 6= i∗.
Lemma 19 For any ti∗ ∈ Ti∗, any i 6= i∗ and any θ ∈ [0, ζi), Φ(θ, ti∗) ≥ Φ(0, ti∗).
Proof Suppose, to the contrary, that Φ(θ, ti∗) < Φ(0, ti∗) for some θ ∈ (0, ζi). Let S :=
{ti ∈ [θ, ζi] : ϕi(ti, ti∗) < Φ(0, ti∗)}. Then Pr(S) > 0, so inf S < ζi. Let
x :=
 inf S if inf S > θsup {ti ∈ [0, θ] : ϕi(ti, ti∗) ≥ Φ(0, ti∗)} if inf S = θ.
Then x < ti < θ ⇒ ϕi(ti, ti∗) < Φ(0, ti∗), and θ < ti < x ⇒ ϕi(ti, ti∗) ≥ Φ(0, ti∗). Thus,
Φ(x, ti∗) < Φ(0, ti∗) and x > 0. By continuity of ϕi(·, ti∗) (Lemma 18), ϕi(x, ti∗) = Φ(0, ti∗).
Now consider a mechanism M̂ which is the same as M(ζ, αi, ti∗) except that bidder i’s
virtual utility function V i is replaced by a function V̂i defined by
V̂i(ti) :=
 V i(ti) if ti ≤ xV i(x) if ti ≥ x.
M̂ is incentive compatible: V̂i is nondecreasing and hence bidder i’s probability of winning
is nondecreasing in his type; the monotonicity of the other bidders’ winning probabilities is
unaffected. The payment rule satisfies the envelope formula because the payment is defined
according to the formula based on
(
V̂i, (Vk)k/∈{i,i∗}
)
. Individual rationality of M̂ is obvious.
Thus, we may assume that bidders participate and are truthful in M̂ . When bidder i’s
type is any ti ∈ [0, x], M̂ acts in the same way as M(ζ, αi, ti∗), generating the same expected
revenue ϕi(ti, ti∗) conditional on ti. When ti > x, by contrast, M̂ acts as M(ζ, αi, ti∗) except
that ti is turned into x, so the expected revenue conditional on ti becomes ϕi(x, ti∗).
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Thus, the expected revenue generated by M̂ is equal to a convex combination between
1
Fi(x|αi,ζi)
∫ x
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi(dti | αi, ζi) and ϕi(x, ti∗). As noted above, ϕi(x, ti∗) = Φ(0, ti∗); also,
by the fact Φ(x, ti∗) < Φ(0, ti∗) proved above,
1
Fi(x | αi, ζi)
∫ x
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi(dti | αi, ζi) > Φ(0, ti∗).
Thus, with the fact x > 0, the expected revenue yielded by M̂ is greater than Φ(0, ti∗), which
contradicts the fact that Φ(0, ti∗) is maximum among all incentive feasible mechanisms.
Corollary 3 For any measurable S ⊆ Ti∗, E
[
ϕi(·, ti∗)1ti∗∈S
]
is continuous on [0, ζi], and
∀θ ∈ (0, ζi) : E
[
Φ(θ, ti∗)1ti∗∈S
] ≥ E [Φ(0, ti∗)1ti∗∈S] . (63)
Proof By Lemma 18, ϕ(·, ti∗) is continuous; by Lemma 19, Φ(θ, ti∗) ≥ Φ(0, ti∗). Thus,
integration of ϕ(·, ti∗) across all ti∗ ∈ S preserves the continuity, and integration of Φ(θ, ti∗) ≥
Φ(0, ti∗) across all ti∗ ∈ S gives Ineq. (63).
Corollary 4 If the distribution of ti changes from the semi-regular Fi(· | αi, ζi) to the regular
Fi,ζi, then seller i∗’s expected payoff generated by M(ζ, αi, ti∗) cannot decrease:∫ ζi
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi,ζi(dti) ≥ Φ(0, ti∗).
Proof To avoid triviality, let αi < ζi. Denote
X :=
1
Fi(αi | αi, ζi)
∫ αi
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi(dti | αi, ζi).
By Eq. (62),
Φ(0, ti∗) = Fi(αi | αi, ζi)X + (1− Fi(αi | αi, ζi)) Φ(αi, ti∗). (64)
By Eqs. (59) and (62),
X =
1
Fi(αi)
∫ αi
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi(dti),
Φ(αi, ti∗) =
1
Fi(ζi)− Fi(αi)
∫ αi
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi(dti).
Combined with Eq. (50), these two equations together imply∫ ζi
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi,ζi(dti) =
1
Fi(ζi)
∫ ζi
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi(dti) =
Fi(αi)
Fi(ζi)
X +
(
1− Fi(αi)
Fi(ζi)
)
Φ(αi, ti∗).
(65)
Since αi < ζi, Lemma 19 implies Φ(αi, ti∗) ≥ Φ(0, ti∗); hence Eq. (64) implies X ≤ Φ(αi, ti∗).
Thus, with Fi(αi | αi, ζi) ≥ Fi(αi)/Fi(ζi) and 1−Fi(αi | αi, ζi) ≤ 1−Fi(αi)/Fi(ζi), Eqs. (64)
and (65) together imply that Φ(0, ti∗) ≤
∫ ζi
0
ϕi(ti, ti∗)Fi,ζi(dti), as desired.
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B A Semicontinuity Property of Monotone Functions
For any weakly increasing function g : [a, z] → R, define g−1inf (y) and g−1sup(y) by Eqs. (1)
and (2), with g taking the role of βk.
Lemma 20 Let g : [a, z]→ R be a weakly increasing function with a < z. For any y ≥ g(a)
and any  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that if y − δ < y′ < y + δ then
g−1inf (y)−  < g−1inf (y′) ≤ g−1sup(y′) < g−1sup(y) + . (66)
Proof First, suppose g(a) < y < g(z). Let  > 0. As g is weakly increasing, we can shrink 
so that g−1inf (y)− 2 and g−1sup(y)+ 2 each belong to [a, z]. By definitions of g−1inf (y) and g−1sup(y),
g
(
g−1inf (y)−

2
)
< y < g
(
g−1sup(y) +

2
)
. (67)
Let
δ := min
{
g
(
g−1sup(y) +

2
)
+ y
2
− y, y − g
(
g−1inf (y)− 2
)
+ y
2
}
.
Then δ > 0. Pick any y′ such that y − δ < y′ < y + δ. Either (i) g−1(y′) = ∅ or (ii)
g−1(y′) 6= ∅. In case (i), since
g
(
g−1inf (y)− /2
)
<
g
(
g−1inf (y)− /2
)
+ y
2
≤ y − δ < y′,
by Eq. (1) we have g−1inf (y
′) ≥ g−1inf (y) − /2 > g−1inf (y) − . In case (ii), if x ∈ g−1(y) and
x < g−1inf (y)− /2, then monotonicity of g implies
y′ = g(x) ≤ g (g−1inf (y)− /2) < g (g−1inf (y)− /2)+ y2 ≤ y − δ,
contradicting the fact that y′ > y−δ; thus, g−1inf (y′) ≥ g−1inf (y)−/2 > g−1inf (y)−. Analogously,
we can show g−1sup(y
′) < g−1sup(y) + . Thus, (66) holds if g(a) < y < g(z).
Next consider the case where y ≥ g(z). If y > g(z) then, for any sufficiently small δ > 0,
y − δ > g(z) and hence y − δ < y′ < y + δ implies g−1inf (y′) = g−1sup(y′) = z = g−1inf (y) = g−1sup(y).
If y = g(z) then we just replace the upper bound g
(
g−1sup(y) +

2
)
in Ineq. (67) by any number
bigger than y, and then the calculation in the previous paragraph follows. The case where
y ≤ g(a) is analogous.
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C Posterior Densities and Virtual Utilities
Proof of Lemma 1 Denote pik(i, bi) for the probability of the event that bidder k, condi-
tional on submitting the highest bid bi (thereby tying with i and possibly others), loses the
tie-breaking lottery. Then (with the convention of letting
∏
j∈∅ xj := 1)
pik(i, bi) =
∑
S⊆I\{i,k}
|S|+ 1
|S|+ 2
(∏
j∈S
(Fj(β
−1
j,sup(bi))− Fj(β−1j,inf(bi)))
) ∏
j∈I\(S∪{i,k})
Fj(β
−1
j,inf(bi))
 .
Note that pik(i, bi) is independent of tk. By Bayes’s rule,
Fk(tk | i, bi, β) =

Fk(tk)
Fk(β
−1
k,inf(bi))+(Fk(β
−1
k,sup(bi))−Fk(β−1k,inf(bi)))pik(i,bi)
if tk ≤ β−1k,inf(bi)
Fk(β
−1
k,inf(bi))+(Fk(tk)−Fk(β−1k,inf(bi)))pik(i,bi)
Fk(β
−1
k,inf(bi))+(Fk(β
−1
k,sup(bi))−Fk(β−1k,inf(bi)))pik(i,bi)
if β−1k,inf(bi) ≤ tk ≤ β−1k,sup(bi).
(68)
Thus, the density
fk(tk | i, bi, β) =

fk(tk)
Fk(β
−1
k,inf(bi))+(Fk(β
−1
k,sup(bi))−Fk(β−1k,inf(bi)))pik(i,bi)
if tk < β
−1
k,inf(bi)
fk(tk)pik(i,bi)
Fk(β
−1
k,inf(bi))+(Fk(β
−1
k,sup(bi))−Fk(β−1k,inf(bi)))pik(i,bi)
if β−1k,inf(bi) < tk ≤ β−1k,sup(bi);
(69)
at the point β−1k,inf(bi), the right density is equal to pik(i, bi) times the left density. Thus,
fk(· | i, bi, β) exists and is strictly positive on the posterior support and is continuous unless
β−1k,inf(bi) 6= β−1k,sup(bi), in which case β−1k,inf(bi) is the only discontinuity point. 
Proof of Lemma 2 For brevity, suppress the symbols i and β unless needed for clarifi-
cation. Let b′ > b ≥ r and consider any bidder k. Denote y := β−1k,inf(b) and z := β−1k,sup(b),
denote y′ and z′ with respect to b′ analogously. For any tk ≤ z, by Eqs. (3), (68) and (69),
Vk(tk | i, b) =
 tk −
pik(i,b)Fk(z)+(1−pik(i,b))Fk(y)−Fk(tk)
fk(tk)
if tk < y
tk − Fk(z)−Fk(tk)fk(tk) if y < tk ≤ z,
(70)
and Vk(tk | i′, b′) is analogous.
To prove Claim (a), suppose that b is not an atom of βk. Then y = z, hence Eq. (70) im-
plies Eq. (4). For any tk ∈
(
0, β−1k,sup(bi)
)
, the derivative of Vk,bi,β, or
d
dti
(
ti − Fk(β
−1
k,sup(bi))−Fk(tk)
fk(tk)
)
by Eq. (4), is no less than either 2 or d
dti
(
ti − 1−Fk(tk)fk(tk)
)
, which, strictly positive on the com-
pact Ti by assumption, is bigger than a λk > 0 constant to ti. Thus, Claim (a.ii) follows, with
λ := maxk∈I min{λk, 2}. Now that Vk,i,b,β is nondecreasing on Tk (Claim (a.ii coupled with
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the lower branch of Eqs. (3)), the ironing procedure is unnecessary and hence Claim (a.i)
follows. Then Claim (a.iii) follows trivially.
Next we prove Claim (b). Since Fk(z) ≥ Fk(y), Eq. (70) implies, with tk ≤ z,
Vk(tk | i, b) ≥ tk − Fk(z)− Fk(tk)
fk(tk)
.
With b′ > b and βk nondecreasing, we have z ≤ y′ ≤ z′ and hence Fk(z) ≤ pik(b′)Fk(z′) +
(1− pik(b′))Fk(y′). Thus,
tk − Fk(z)− Fk(tk)
fk(tk)
≥ tk − pik(i
′, b′)Fk(z′) + (1− pik(i′, b′))Fk(y′)− Fk(tk)
fk(tk)
= Vk(tk | i′, b′),
where the equality holds because tk ≤ z ≤ y′. Thus,
∀tk ∈ [0, z] : Vk(tk | i, b) ≥ Vk(tk | i′, b′). (71)
When b is an atom of βk, y 6= z and the two branches of Eq. (70) do not coincide. Further-
more, as in the previous paragraph, the strict monotonicity assumption of the prior virtual
utility implies that each branch is strictly increasing in tk. Thus, Vk(· | i, b) strictly increases
on [0, y), drops at the point y, and then strictly increases again on (y, z] (and reaches z when
tk = z). Analogous observation holds for Vk(· | i′, b′). By monotonicity of βk, y ≤ z ≤ y′ ≤ z′.
Thus, based on the ironing procedure, V k(tk | i, b) < Vk(tk | i, b) only if tk ≤ y < z,
and V k(tk | i′, b′) > Vk(tk | i′, b′) only if y′ ≤ tk < z′. (See Figure 3.)
0 y z
z
V k(y | i, b)
lim
tk↑y
Vk(tk | i, b)
lim
tk↓y
Vk(tk | i, b)
tk
Figure 3: The thick curve: V k(· | i, b), the ironed posterior virtual utility
To extend Ineq. (71) to V thereby proving Claim (b), it suffices to consider the case
where V k(tk | i, b) < Vk(tk | i, b) or V k(tk | i′, b′) > Vk(tk | i′, b′) is true. First, consider those
tk such that V k(tk | i, b) < Vk(tk | i, b), which requires tk ≤ y < z. Now that tk ≤ y < z ≤ y′,
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V k(tk | i′, b′) ≤ Vk(tk | i′, b′). By the ironing procedure, V k(tk | i, b) > limτ↓y Vk(τ | i, b).
Since y < z ≤ y′, Vk(· | i′, b′) is increasing on [0, z]; thus, with tk ≤ y,
Vk(tk | i′, b′) ≤ lim
τ↓y
Vk(τ | i′, b′)
(71)
≤ lim
τ↓y
Vk(τ | i, b).
Thus,
V k(tk | i′, b′) ≤ Vk(tk | i′, b′) ≤ lim
τ↓y
Vk(τ | i, b) < V k(tk | i, b).
Second, consider those tk such that V k(tk | i′, b′) > Vk(tk | i′, b′), which requires y′ < z′
and tk ≥ y′. By the ironing procedure, V k(y′ | i′, b′) < limτ↑y′ Vk(τ | i′, b′). As the lemma
covers only those tk in [0, z], with z ≤ y′ we need only to consider the case z = y′ and
prove V (z | i, b) ≥ V (z | i′, b′). By the ironing procedure, V k(z | i, b) = Vk(z | i, b) = z
while limτ↑z Vk(τ | i′, b′) < z by Eq. (3) and z < z′. Thus, V k(z | i′, b′) = V k(y′ | i′, b′) <
limτ↑y′ Vk(τ | i′, b′) < V k(z | i, b). Both cases considered, we have proved the lemma. 
D Details of the Increasing Difference Theorem
Lemma 5 From player i’s viewpoint, the continuation equilibrium is equivalent to an
incentive feasible direct revelation mechanism that solicits from i an alleged type tˆi and then
plays the continuation equilibrium on his behalf in every possible event of the auction. In
the event where i wins with bid bi, i’s period-two expected payoff is equal to tiQi(bi, tˆi, β) +
Ri(bi, tˆi, β), with ti being his true type, Qi(bi, tˆi, β) his expected probability of being the final
owner, and Ri(bi, tˆi, β) his expected revenue. The best-reply condition of the continuation
equilibrium implies that the expected payoff is maximized when tˆi = ti. Then the envelope
theorem of Milgrom and Segal [11, Theorem 2], applicable because Qi the partial derivative
of this expected payoff with respect to ti is uniformly bounded, implies (16). Analogously,
the continuation equilibrium in the event that i does not win the period-one auction implies
Li(bi, ti, β) = Li(bi, 0, β) +
∫ ti
0
qi(bi, τi, β)dτi.
The resale mechanism, optimal for the reseller, leaves zero surplus to the zero type of any
other bidder. Thus, Li(bi, 0, β) = 0 and Eq. (17) follows. 
Propositions 1 Pick any t := (ti, t−i) such that maxk 6=i βk(tk) ≤ b′i. To avoid triviality,
assume b′i ≥ r. By Lemma 2.b and b′′i > b′i, V k(tk | i, b′i, β) ≥ V k(tk | i, b′′i , β) for all
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k 6= i. Thus, by provision (b) in definition of the resale mechanism (§3.1.4), if Qi(b′i, t, β) = 1
then ti > maxk 6=i V k(tk | i, b′i, β) ≥ maxk 6=i ≥ V k(tk | i, b′′i , β), hence Qi(b′′i , t, β) = 1. If
Qi(b
′′
i , t, β) < 1 then ti ≤ maxk 6=i V k(tk | i, b′′i , β) ≤ maxk 6=i V k(tk | i, b′i, β). Then either (i)
at least one of the weak inequalities is strict or (ii) both weak inequalities are equalities. In
case (i), Qi(b
′
i, t, β) = 0. In case (ii), the final owner in either history, (i, b
′
i) and (i, b
′′
i ), is
randomly chosen with equal probability between i and those whose posterior virtual utilities
are highest among k 6= i; since V k(tk | i, b′i, β) ≥ V k(tk | i, b′′i , β), there cannot be more of
such finalists in the history (i, b′′i ) than in (i, b
′
i), hence Qi(b
′′
i , t, β) ≥ Qi(b′i, t, β). 
Proposition 2 Pick any (ti, t−i) such that bi ≥ maxk 6=i βk(tk). To avoid triviality, assume
qi(t, β) > 0. That mans (i) some bidder j 6= i wins, i.e., βj(tj) = maxk 6=i βk(tk) ≥ r, and (ii)
j may resell the good to i, i.e., by provision (b) of the resale mechanism (§3.1.4),
V i(ti | j, βj(tj), β) ≥ max
{
tj, max
k∈I\{i,j}
V k(tk | j, βj(tj), β)
}
. (72)
By Lemma 2.b and bi ≥ βj(tj) ≥ βk(tk) for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}, we have V k(tk | j, βj(tj), β) ≥
V k(tk | i, bi, β) for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}. Combining this with the fact that tj ≥ V j(tj | i, bi, β)
and ti ≥ V i(ti | j, βj(tj), β), each due to the definition of virtual utilities, we have ti ≥
maxk 6=i V k(tk | i, bi, β). If ti > maxk 6=i V k(tk | i, bi, β) then Qi(bi, t, β) = 1. Otherwise,
ti = maxk 6=i V k(tk | i, bi, β), which forces (72) into an equality; then by provision (b) of the
reale mechanism, in both histories (i, bi) and (j, βj(tj)), the final owner is chosen via equal-
probability lotteries from i and the other highest contenders. Since V k(tk | j, βj(tj), β) ≥
V k(tk | i, bi, β) and tj ≥ V j(tj | i, bi, β), there cannot be more of such finalists in history (i, bi)
than in (j, βj(tj)); hence Qi(bi, t, β) ≥ qi(t, β). 
E Details of the No-Tie Theorem
E.1 Proof of Lemma 7
Denote x := b∗. Let  > 0. Since the density fi of ti is positive on its compact support [0, ti]
for every i ∈ I, there exists η˜() > 0 such that
0 < η < η˜() =⇒ ∀i ∈ I : ∀y ∈ Ti : Prob {y ≤ ti ≤ y + 4η} < 
maxj∈I tj
. (73)
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Pick any η > 0 such that
η < min
{
η˜(), ,min
k∈J
(zk − ak)
}
. (74)
For any δ > 0, let
Nmi (x; δ) := (x− δ, x+ δ) ∩Bmi .
By Lemma 20 and monotonicity of β∗i , there exists a δ˜() > 0 such that
∀i ∈ I : (β∗i )−1
(
Nmi (x; 2δ˜())
)
⊆ (ai − η, zi + η). (75)
As βm → β∗ pointwise almost everywhere, βm → β∗ uniformly except on a set E∗ := Πi∈IE∗i
such that each E∗i has Lebesgue measure less than η (Littlewood’s third principle or Egoroff’s
theorem). Thus, for any δ > 0 such that
δ ≤ δ˜(), (76)
there exists m˜(δ) with
2−m˜(δ) < δ˜()/2 (77)
such that for every integer m ≥ m˜(δ) and for every i ∈ I, we have
∀ti ∈ Ti \ E∗i : |βmi (ti)− β∗i (ti)| < δ/2, (78)
(β∗i )
−1 (Nmi (x; δ/2)) ⊆ (ai − η, zi + η), (79)
where (79) follows from (75) and (76).
Now we construct an infinite subsequence (βmn)∞n=1. For each n = 1, 2, . . ., let n :=
1/n. With n taking the role of , there exists ηn as the left-hand side of Ineq. (74) and δ˜(n)
specified in Eq. (75). Let
δn := min
{
1/n, δ˜(n), x− l
}
. (80)
Hence there exists an m˜(δn) satisfying Ineq. (77). Let
mn := min{m = 1, 2, . . . : m ≥ m˜(δn);m ≥ mn−1 + 1}.
Note that n′ > n⇒ mn′ > mn. Hence subsequence (βmn)∞n=1 is constructed. Also Eqs. (78)
and (79) are satisfied when (mn, δn, ηn) plays the role of (m, δ, η).
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First, we claim that, for each i ∈ I,
∀ti ∈ (β∗i )−1 (Nmni (x; δn/2)) \ E∗i : x− δn < βmni (ti) < x+ δn, (81)
(βmni )
−1 (Nmni (x; δn + 2
−mn)) \ E∗i ⊆ (ai − ηn, zi + ηn). (82)
To prove (81), pick any ti ∈ (β∗i )−1 (Nmni (x; δn/2)) \ E∗i . Then
βmni (ti)
(78)
< β∗i (ti) + δn/2 < x+ δn/2 + δn/2 = x+ δn,
and analogously βmni (ti) > x − δn. To prove (82), suppose ti ≤ ai − ηn. Then (75) and
monotonicity of β∗i imply β
∗
i (ti) ≤ x− 2δ˜(n); according to (78), either ti ∈ E∗i , or
βmni (ti) < β
∗
i (ti)+δn/2 ≤ x−2δ˜(n)+δn/2
(76)
≤ x−2δ˜(n)+δ˜(n)/2 = x−δ˜(n)−δ˜(n)/2 < x−δn−2−mn ,
with the last inequality due to (76) and (77). Analogously, ti ≥ zi+ηn implies either ti ∈ E∗i
or βmni (ti) > x+ δn + 2
−mn . Hence (82) follows.
Second, we show that, for each i ∈ J , ani and zni defined by Eqs. (26) and (27) exist
and “ai < z
n
i and zi > a
n
i ” holds. By definition of ai and zi, (ai, zi) ⊆ (β∗i )−1(Nmni (x; δn/2)).
Since the Lebesgue measure of E∗i is less than ηn, which by (74) is smaller than zi−ai, there
exists ti ∈ (ai, zi) \E∗i ⊆ (β∗i )−1 (Nmni (x; δn/2)) \E∗i . Hence (81) implies that the sets on the
right-hand sides of Eqs. (26) and (27) are nonempty. Thus, ani and z
n
i exist. By the choice
of this ti and Ineq. (78), we have β
mn
i (ti) < β
∗
i (ti) + δn/2 = x + δn/2. Thus, by definition
of zni , ti ≤ zni . Hence ai < zni , otherwise ti > ai ≥ zni , a contradiction. Analogously, zi > ani .
Third, (28) follows from Eqs. (26) and (27) and the fact that βmni is nondecreasing.
Fourth, we prove (30). Recall that (ai, zi) ⊆ (β∗i )−1(Nmni (x; δn/2)) and ani < zi. Thus,
if ai < a
n
i then (81) implies that (ai, a
n
i ) ⊆ E∗i ; with E∗i of Lebesgue measure less than ηn, we
have ani −ai < ηn. Analogously we have zi− zni < ηn. Also, if ani < ai− ηn, then (82) implies
(ani , ai − ηn) ⊆ E∗i and hence the interval cannot be longer than ηn; hence ai − ani < 2ηn.
Analogously we have zni − zi < 2ηn. Thus, since ηn < n by (74), we have (30).
Fifth, we prove (29) and (31). For any k ∈ I \J , (β∗k)−1(x) is either singleton or empty,
hence ak = zk by definition. Thus, it follows from (82) that (β
mn
k )
−1 (Nmnk (x; δn + 2
−mn))
is either contained in (ak − ηn, ak] ∪ [zk, zk + ηn) or contained in E∗k . Since the Lebesgue
measure of neither set is bigger than 2ηn, (73) implies (31). Likewise, (73) implies (29)
for any i ∈ J because, by (82), {ti ∈ Ti : x+ δn ≤ βmni (ti) < x+ δn + 2−mn} is contained in
E∗i ∪ [zni , zi + ηn).
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E.2 Proof of the Decomposition Equation (34)
Eq. (34) is the same as the following equation: for any bids b′i, bi ∈ Bi with b′i > bi,
Ui(b
′
i, ti, β)− Ui(bi, ti, β)
= E [1 [b′i  t−i]]
(
W i(b
′
i, ti, β)−W i(bi, ti, β)
)− (b′i − bi) Pr {b′i  t−i} (83)
+Pr {b′i  t−i, bi 6 t−i}
(
W i(bi, ti, β)− bi − Li(b′i, bi, ti, β)
)
,
where bi  t−i is a shorthand for i’s winning event, bi 6 t−i its complement, and
Li(b
′
i, bi, ti, β) := E [Li(t−i | ti, β) | b′i  t−i, bi 6 t−i] .
To prove Eq. (83), note that Eq. (10) says, with the symbols (ti, β) suppressed,
Ui(bi) = E [1 [bi  t−i] (Wi(t−i | bi)− bi − Li(t−i))] + E [Li(t−i)] .
Then for any bids b′i > bi,
Ui(b
′
i)− Ui(bi) = E [1 [b′i  t−i]Wi(t−i | b′i)]− E [1 [bi  t−i]Wi(t−i | bi)]
−b′iE [1 [b′i  t−i]] + biE [1 [bi  t−i]] + E [(1 [bi  t−i]− 1 [b′i  t−i])Li(t−i)]
(12)
= E [1 [b′i  t−i]]W i(b′i)− E [1 [bi  t−i]]W i(bi)
−b′iE [1 [b′i  t−i]] + biE [1 [bi  t−i]]− E [1 [bi 6 t−i, b′i  t−i]Li(t−i)] .
Then Eq. (83) follows from breaking apart 1 [bi  t−i] = 1 [b′i  t−i]− 1 [bi 6 t−i, b′i  t−i].
E.3 Proof of Lemma 8
Suppose that the lemma is not true. Then, extracting a subsequence and relabeling super-
scripts if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
cnj < max
k∈J\{j}
β¯nk (tk) ≤ b∗ + δn
}
> 0. (84)
By definition of cnj in Eq. (38) and monotonicity of β¯
n
j ,
∀n : ∃n ∈
(
0,min
{
1/n,max
k∈J
(zk − aj)/2
})
: ∀tj ∈ (anj , anj + n) : β¯nj (tj) = cnj . (85)
(The above choice of n is feasible because by Ineq. (37) zk > ak ≥ aj for every k ∈ J .) Let
n 7→ tnj be any choice function such that for each n
tnj ∈
(
anj , a
n
j + n
)
.
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We shall derive a contradiction by proving that for some sufficiently large n the type-tnj
bidder j strictly prefers to deviate from his mn-equilibrium bid c
n
j to the bid
bnj := min
{
bj ∈ Bmnj : bj ≥ b∗ + δn
}
.
To prove this claim, first we establish limn→∞∆Πnj (t
n
j ) ≥ 0. By Eq. (36), ∆Πnj (tnj )
is equal to a probability times W j(c
n
j , t
n
j , β¯
n) − cnj − Lnj (tnj ). Hence it suffices to show
limn→∞
(
W j(c
n
j , t
n
j , β¯
n)− cnj − Lnj (tnj )
) ≥ 0. To this end, we first claim that
lim
n→∞
E
[
Lj(t−j | tnj , β¯n) | t−j ∈ Ωnj
]
= 0, (86)
where Ωnj :=
{
t−j ∈ T−j : cnj < maxk 6=j β¯nk (tk) < bnj
}
is the pivotal event of the bid increase.
Conditional on Ωnj , the winning probability for bidders outside J vanishes as n enlarges
(Lemma 7). Thus, Ineq. (86) is unchanged when its integrand Lj(t−j | tnj , β¯n) is replaced by∑
k∈J\{j}
1
[
β¯nk (tk) > max
j′ /∈{i,j}
β¯nj′(tj′)
]
Ljk
(
t−j | tnj , β¯n
)
.
For any k ∈ J \ {j}, bidder j’s payoff Ljk from losing the auction to bidder k cannot
exceed tnj − tk. Since tnj < anj + n < anj +1/n by the choice of tnj and n (Eq. (85)), and since
ani →n ai for each i ∈ J , we have for any tk ∈ (ank , znk ):
tnj < a
n
j + n ≤ aj +O(1/n)
(37)
≤ ak +O(1/n) ≤ ank +O(1/n) < tk +O(1/n).
Thus, 0 ≤ Lnjk(t−j | tnj , β¯n) ≤ tnj − tk = O(1/n) for any t−j ∈ Ω˜njk. That proves (86). Thus,
lim
n→∞
(
W j(c
n
j , t
n
j , β¯
n)− cnj − Lnj (tnj )
)
= lim
n→∞
(
W j(c
n
j , t
n
j , β¯
n)− cnj )
) ≥ 0,
with the second inequality due to the fact β¯nj (t
n
j ) = c
n
j and Lemma 6. We have therefore
proved limn→∞∆Πnj (t
n
j ) ≥ 0.
Second, by Eq. (85),
tnj < a
n
j + n ≤ aj+ n+O(1/n) < aj+max
k∈J
(zk−aj)/2+O(1/n) = max
k∈J
(zk+aj)/2+O(1/n),
hence limn→∞ tnj ≤ maxk∈J(zk + aj)/2 < maxk∈J zk ≤ maxk 6=j zk. Thus, Lemma 9 implies
lim supn→∞∆W
n
j (t
n
j ) > 0. Plugging this inequality, limn→∞∆Π
n
j (t
n
j ) ≥ 0, and limn→∞(bnj −
cnj ) = 0 (c
n
j ∈ (b∗−δn, b∗+δn) since tnj ∈ (anj , znj )) into Eq. (34), we have lim supn→∞∆Unj (tnj ) >
0. Thus, there are sufficiently large n for which the type-tnj bidder j strictly prefers deviating
to bnj from his mn-equilibrium bid c
n
j . This contradiction proves the lemma.
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E.4 A Dominant Rival’s Resale Mechanisms
The two lemmas here, where the bid increase is slightly more general than the one specified in
the proof of Theorem 2, help us to predict the resale mechanism employed by the dominant
bidder j specified in Lemma 8 when he wins with a bid clustered at b∗. In that event, j’s
winning bid ranges within a neighborhood where his rivals rarely bid, hence his posterior
belief about the others stays mostly constant to his winning bid, and so are the posterior
virtual utility functions and payment rules at resale. That is formalized by Lemma 21.
Lemma 22 further calculates the price markup that j would charge a bidder-type to whom
he would resell for sure. We shall use the notation Vk,x defined in Eq. (44).
Lemma 21 Let b∗ be a serious bid and an atom of β∗j , with (β¯
n)∞n=1 specified by Lemma 7.
For any i 6= j and any n let cni ∈ Bmni ∪ {l} and bni specified by Eq. (43) such that cni < bni
and Eq. (40) is satisfied. If xn is someone’s winning bid in [cni , b
n
i ] for each n = 1, 2, . . ., then
for any k ∈ I \ {j}, with zk specified in Eq. (25),
lim
n→∞
(
β¯n
)−1
k,sup
(xn) = zk, (87)
∀tk ∈ Tk : lim
n→∞
Vk
(
tk | xn, β¯n
)
= Vk,zk(tk), (88)
and, if in addition zk > max
{
tj,maxk′ /∈{j,k} Vk′,zk′ (tk′)
}
, then
lim
n→∞
pk,j,xn,β¯n(tj, t−(j,k)) = V−1k,zk
(
max
{
tj, max
k′ /∈{j,k}
Vk′,zk′ (tk′)
})
. (89)
Proof Let k ∈ I \ {j}. Since xn ∈ [cni , bni ], Eqs. (29), (31) and (40) together imply that
the probability measure of the interval between
(
β¯n
)−1
k,sup
(xn) and znk (defined in Eq. (27))
vanishes. Thus, Eq. (87) follows from the no-gap assumption of Fk and the fact z
n
k →n zk by
Eq. (30). To prove (88), note that xn, a winning bid in the mn-approximation game, is not
an atom of the losers’ strategies, due to Eq. (19). Thus, Vk
(
tk | xn, β¯n
)
obey Eq. (4) if tk ≤(
β¯n
)−1
k,sup
(xn), and is equal to
(
β¯n
)−1
k,sup
(xn) if tk ≥
(
β¯n
)−1
k,sup
(xn). Then Eq. (88) follows from
Eqs. (44) and (87). To prove Eq. (89), let its condition zk > max
{
tj,maxk′ /∈{j,k} Vk′,zk′ (tk′)
}
be satisfied. Then Eqs. (87) and (88) imply(
β¯n
)−1
i,sup
(xn) > max
{
tj, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,xn,β¯n(tk)
}
for sufficiently large n. Thus, since j’s winning bid is not an atom of β¯n−j, the conditions for
Eq. (6) are satisfied. Plug Eq. (88) for all k′ 6= j into Eq. (6) and we obtain Eq. (89).
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Lemma 22 Let b∗, i, j, (cni , b
n
i )
∞
n=1 be specified by the hypothesis of Lemma 21 and (ak, zk)k∈I
by Eqs. (24)–(25). If tni →n ti such that ti > aj and Vi,zi(ti) ≥ zk for all k /∈ {i, j} then
lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ; tj < tni
]
< ti − b∗. (90)
Proof Let tj ∈ (aj,min{zj, ti}). Eq. (89) holds for any k = i and t−(i,j) ∈
∏
k/∈{i,j}[0, zk), as
ti > max
{
tj, max
k/∈{i,j}
zk
}
≥ max
{
tj, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,zk(tk)
}
(91)
by hypothesis of the lemma. Integrating Eq. (89) across all such t−(i,j) gives
E
[
V−1i,zi
(
max
{
tj, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,zk(tk)
})∣∣∣∣ t−(i,j) 5 z−(i,j)]
= lim
n→∞
E
[
pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
(
tj, t−(i,j)
) | t−(i,j) 5 z−(i,j)]
= lim
n→∞
E
[
pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
(
tj, t−(i,j)
) ∣∣∣∣β¯nj (tj) > maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk)
]
,
with the second line due to Eq. (87) applied to the case xn = β¯nj (tj). By Eq. (52),
W j
(
β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯
n
)
= E
[
max
{
tj,max
k 6=j
Vk,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(tk)
}∣∣∣∣ β¯nj (tj) > maxk 6=j β¯nk (tk)
]
.
By Eqs. (87) and (88),
lim
n→∞
W j
(
β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯
n
)
= E
[
max
{
tj,max
k 6=j
Vk,zk(tk)
}∣∣∣∣ t−j 5 z−j] .
Thus,
lim
n→∞
(
E
[
pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
(
tj, t−(i,j)
) ∣∣∣∣β¯nj (tj) > maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk)
]
−W j
(
β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯
n
))
= E
[
V−1i,zi
(
max
{
tj, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,zk(tk)
})∣∣∣∣ t−(i,j) 5 z−(i,j)]− E [max{tj,maxk 6=j Vk,zk(tk)
}∣∣∣∣ t−j 5 z−j] ,
which is strictly positive by Ineq. (53) with j playing the role i∗ there, since zi ≥ ti and ti
satisfies Ineq. (91). The above-displayed difference, when its W j
(
β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯
n
)
is replaced
by β¯nj (tj), remains strictly positive because β¯
n
j (tj) ≤ W j
(
β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯
n
)
by Lemma 6. Thus,
lim
n→∞
(
E
[
pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
(
tj, t−(i,j)
) ∣∣∣∣β¯nj (tj) > maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk)
]
− β¯nj (tj)
)
> 0.
This being true for all tj ∈ (aj,min{zj, ti}), integrating the inequality across all such tj and
noting that tj ∈ (aj, zj) implies β¯nj (tj)→n b∗, we have
lim
n→∞
E
[
pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
(
tj, t−(i,j)
) ∣∣∣∣β¯nj (tj) > maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk); tj ∈ [aj,min{zj, ti}]
]
> b∗. (92)
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With the notation Ωni , defined in Eq. (45), for the pivotal event of the bid increase,
lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ; tj < tni
]
(93)
= lim
n→∞
E
[
Lij(t−i | tni , β¯n)
∣∣∣∣β¯nj (tj) > maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk); tj ∈ [aj, zj]; tj ≤ ti
]
,
where the substitution of Lij for Li is due to Eqs. (29) and (40), and the substitution in
the conditioned event is due to (anj , z
n
j , t
n
i ) →n (aj, zj, ti) (Eq. (30)). By the hypothesis
Vi,zi(ti) ≥ maxk/∈{i,j} zk and Eq. (88), we have for any tj ≤ (aj,min{zj, ti}),
lim
n→∞
(
Vi,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t
n
i )−max
{
tj, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vi,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(tk)
})
≥ 0
and hence the probability with which the type-tni bidder i wins in j’s resale mechanism
conditional on the pivotal event goes to one. I.e., the integrand Lij(t−i | tni , β¯n) in Eq. (93)
can be replaced by tni − pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
(
tj, t−(i,j)
)
and we have
lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ; tj < tni
]
= lim
n→∞
E
[
tni − pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
(
tj, t−(i,j)
) ∣∣∣∣β¯nj (tj) > maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk); tj ∈ [aj,min{zj, ti}]
]
,
which is strictly less than ti − b∗ by Ineq. (92). Hence (90) is proved.
E.5 Proof of Lemma 9
Since bni ≥ b∗ + δn by definition of bni , the probability with which bni wins is no less than
Pr
{
b∗ + δn > maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk)
}
, and lim supn→∞ Pr
{
b∗ + δn > maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk)
}
> 0 by the con-
sequentiality of b∗ and the convergence β¯n → β∗. Thus, by Eq. (35), it suffices to show
lim sup
n→∞
(
W i(b
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n)−W i(cni , tni , β¯n)
)
> 0.
To this end, denote ynk :=
(
β¯n
)−1
k,sup
(cni ) for each k ∈ I. Extracting a convergent subsequence
and relabeling superscripts if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality
∀k ∈ I ∃yk ∈ Tk : lim
n→∞
ynk = yk. (94)
By Eq. (44), V−1k,x(ti) is continuous in x for any ti ∈ [0, x]. Thus, if ti < zk then
∀k ∈ I \ {i} : lim
n→∞
V−1k,ynk (ti) = V
−1
k,yk
(ti). (95)
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The rest of the proof uses Proposition 4, with (ynk )k 6=i and (z
n
k )k 6=i playing the role of ζ
and ζ ′ there. The proposition is applicable because the winning bids cni and b
n
i are not atoms
of β¯n−i, hence the posterior virtual utility functions obey Eq. (4). There are only two cases:
either (i) ti ≥ maxj 6=i yj or (ii) ti < yj for some j 6= i.
Case (i): This implies, by Eq. (94), tni +1/n ≥ maxj 6=i ynj for sufficiently large n. Since
ti < maxk 6=i zk by hypothesis of the lemma, Eq. (30) implies tni < maxk 6=i z
n
k for sufficiently
large n. Thus, maxj 6=i ynj − 1/n ≤ tni < maxk 6=i znk for sufficiently large n. For any such n,
W i(c
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n) ≤ tni + 1/n because the public history (i, cni ) implies tj ≤ ynj for each j 6= i.
Thus, mimicking the reasoning for Ineq. (55), we have, for some j 6= i with zj > ti,
W i(b
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n)−W i(cni , tni , β¯n) ≥
1− Fj
(
V−1j,znj (tni )
)
Fj(znj )
(V−1j,znj (tni )− tni − 1/n) .
Since tni → ti and zni →n zi, Eq. (95) and the continuity of V−1j,znj together imply that the right-
hand side converges to
(
1− Fj
(
V−1j,zj(ti)
)
/Fj(zj)
)(
V−1j,zj(ti)− ti
)
, which is strictly positive
since V−1j,zj(ti) > ti due to zj > ti (which implies zj > V−1j,yj > ti by Eq. (44)).
Case (ii): By Eq. (94), for infinitely many n, tni < y
n
j and hence Ineq. (56) holds, i.e.,
W i(b
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n)−W i(cni , tni , β¯n) ≥ γn Pr
{
cni < max
j∈J\{i}
β¯nj (tj) < b
n
i
}
,
where according to Eq. (57)
γn =
∏
k 6=i Fk(y
n
k )−
∏
k 6=i Fk
(
min
{
V−1k,ynk (t
n
i ), y
n
k
})
(∏
k 6=i Fk(z
n
k )
)(∏
k 6=i Fk(y
n
k )
) tni .
By Ineq. (41), lim supn→∞ Pr
{
cni < maxj∈J\{i} β¯
n
j (tj) < b
n
i
}
> 0; by Eq. (95),
lim sup
n→∞
γn =
∏
k 6=i Fk(yk)−
∏
k 6=i Fk
(
min
{V−1k,yk(ti), yk})(∏
k 6=i Fk(zk)
)(∏
k 6=i Fk(yk)
) ti > 0,
where the inequality is due to the fact ti < yj (which implies ti < V−1j,yj < yj by Eq. (44)).
Hence again lim supn→∞
(
W i(b
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n)−W i(cni , tni , β¯n)
)
> 0, as desired.
E.6 Proof of Lemma 10
By Eqs. (36), (45) and (46), the pivotal effect equals ∆Πni (t
n
i ) = Pr(Ω
n
i )ψ
n
i (t
n
i ). By Ineq. (41),
limn Pr(Ω
n
i ) > 0. Thus, it suffices to show limn ψ
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0. To this end, note that Lemma 22
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is applicable. Furthermore, since (znj , t
n
i )→n (zj, ti) and zj ≤ ti by hypothesis of this lemma,
limn Pr{tj < tni | t−i ∈ Ωni } = 1. Hence
lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni
]
= lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ; tj < tni
]
< ti − b∗
by Ineq. (90). Thus, by the fact that W i
(
cni , t
n
i , β¯
n
) ≥ tni and cni →n b∗ (Ineq. (42)),
lim
n→∞
(
W i
(
cni , t
n
i , β¯
n
)− cni − E [Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ]) > ti − b∗ − (ti − b∗) = 0,
which means, by Eq. (46), that limn ψ
n
i (t
n
i ) > 0, as desired.
E.7 Proof of Lemma 11
Step 1: A resale mechanism for bidder i In the mn-approximation game, bidder i
upon winning can offer resale via the following game form Mn for bidders k 6= i, with the
notation (zni ,Vi,zni ) defined in Eqs. (27) and (44):
a. Every bidder k 6= i picks an element from [0, znk ], say tk, and reports it as k’s type.
b. If tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni ) then—
i. i resells the good to a bidder k ∈ I \ {i} for whom
Vk,cni ,β¯n(tk) ≥ max
{
tni , max
h/∈{i,k}
Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
}
at the price V −1
k,cni ,β¯
n
(
max
{
tni ,maxh/∈{i,k} Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
})
;
ii. if no such k exists then i keeps the good.
c. If tj < Vi,zni (tni ) then—
i. i resells the good to a bidder k ∈ I \ {i, j} for whom
Vk,cni ,β¯n(tk) ≥ max
{
Vi,zni (tni ), maxh/∈{i,j,k}Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
}
at the price V −1
k,cni ,β¯
n
(
max
{
Vi,zni (tni ),maxh/∈{i,j,k} Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
})
;
ii. if no such k exists then i keeps the good.
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We claim that the mechanismMn is ex post incentive feasible. It is ex post individually
rational because a bidder k 6= i can stay out by reporting his type being zero, thereby
reporting a negative virtual utility. This gives him zero probability to win in Case (b), as
tni ≥ 0. This also renders zero winning probability in Case (c), where tj ≤ Vi,zni (tni ) implies
Vi,zni (tni ) ≥ 0. Thus, in either case bidder k can stay out thereby ensuring zero payoff.
The mechanism Mn is also ex post incentive compatible. For any k 6= i and any t−k, if
bidder k’s true type is tk, then by the rules in (b) and (c) his payoff conditional on winning
is positive if and only if tk > V
−1
k,cni ,β¯
n (v
n
k (t−k)), where
vnk (t−k) :=
 max
{
tni ,maxh/∈{i,k} Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
}
if tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni )
max
{
Vi,zni (tni ),maxh/∈{i,j,k} Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
}
if tj < Vi,zni (tni ).
With Vk,cni ,β¯n strictly increasing, tk > V
−1
k,cni ,β¯
n (v
n
k (t−k)) is equivalent to Vk,cni ,β¯n(tk) > v
n
k (t−k),
i.e., the event that k wins in Mn after reporting truthfully. Thus, having a positive payoff
from winning in Mn is equivalent to the event that he should win after truthtelling. Since
the payoff from not winning in Mn is equal to zero, this implies incentive compatibility for
any bidder k ∈ I \ {i}.
Step 2: Bidder i’s expected payoff as a reseller Denote wˆn(t−i) for i’s ex post payoff
generated by the participation and truthtelling equilibrium in Mn when the realized type
profile across k 6= i is t−i. By revealed preference,
W i
(
cni , t
n
i , β¯
n
) ≥ E [wˆn(t−i) ∣∣∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
.
Denote
Xn := E
[
1
[
tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni )
]
(wˆn (t−i)− cni )
∣∣∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
,
Y n := E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
]
(wˆn (t−i)− cni )
∣∣∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
.
Then
W i
(
cni , t
n
i , β¯
n
)− cni ≥ Xn + Y n.
To calculate Xn, note from its definition that it is an integral on the set of t−i such
that tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni ). At such t−i, mechanism Mn follows its rule (b), which coincides with the
resale mechanism Mi(c
n
i , t
n
i , β¯
n) that the type-tni bidder i would choose upon winning with
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bid cni . (The posterior virtual utility functions conditional on the public history (i, c
n
i ) are(
Vk,cni ,β¯
)
k 6=i
because Lemma 2.a.i applies, as cni is not an atom of β¯
n
−i.) Thus,
Xn = E
[
1
[
tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni )
] (
Wi
(
t−i | cni , tni , β¯n
)− cni ) ∣∣∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
.
If Pr
{
tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni )
∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni } = 0 then Xn = 0; else then Lemma 19 implies
E
[
Wi
(
t−i | cni , tni , β¯n
) ∣∣∣∣tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni );maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
≥ E
[
Wi
(
t−i | cni , tni , β¯n
) ∣∣∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
.
Thus,
Xn ≥ Pr
{
tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni )
∣∣∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
}
E
[
Wi
(
t−i | cni , tni , β¯n
)− cni ∣∣∣∣maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
;
furthermore, since β¯ni (t
n
i ) = c
n
i , the second factor on the right-hand side according to
Lemma 6 is nonnegative. Thus, Xn ≥ 0 and hence
W i
(
cni , t
n
i , β¯
n
)− cni ≥ Y n. (96)
To calculate Y n, note from its definition that it is an integral on the set of t−i such
that tj < Vi,zni (tni ). At such t−i, mechanism Mn follows its rule (c), under which tj has no
effect on the outcome of Mn, hence i’s ex post payoff wˆn(t−i) from Mn is constant to tj.
Since the indicator 1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
]
is weakly decreasing in tj, with wˆ
n(t−i) independent
of tj and nonnegative, 1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
]
wˆn(t−i) is a weakly decreasing function of tj for any
t−(i,j). Hence the integral of this function cannot increase when we move upward some mass
of tj, by replacing the conditioned event maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk) < c
n
i with the one in the following:
Y n ≥ E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
]
(wˆn (t−i)− cni )
∣∣∣∣cni < β¯nj (tj) < bni ; maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk) < cni
]
.
By Eq. (40), we can replace the above conditioned event by Ωni defined in Eq. (45). Thus,
lim
n→∞
Y n ≥ lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
]
(wˆn (t−i)− cni ) | t−i ∈ Ωni
]
. (97)
Step 3: The winner’s curse By Eq. (40), the probability with which bidders k /∈ {i, j}
wins given Ωni vanishes as n→∞. Thus, the loser’s payoff for i comes mainly from i’s payoff
from losing to j, i.e., when bidder j with some type tj wins with bid β¯
n
j (tj) ∈ (cni , bni ). In
that event, bidder j chooses the resale mechanismMj
(
β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯
n
)
, which is determined by
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posterior virtual utility functions
(
Vk,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
)
k 6=j
(due to Lemma 2.a.i, applicable because
the winning bid β¯nj (tj) is not an atom of β¯
n
−j, by Eq. (19)). Recall that the probability with
which bidder i gets to buy the good from j is denoted by qij
(
tni , t−i, β¯
n
)
, with the price
denoted by pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−i). Thus,
lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni
]
(40)
= lim
n→∞
E
[(
tni − pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−i)
)
qij
(
tni , t−i, β¯
n
)∣∣∣ t−i ∈ Ωni ] (98)
= lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
] (
tni − pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−i)
)
qij
(
tni , t−i, β¯
n
)∣∣∣ t−i ∈ Ωni ] ,
where the second equality holds because tj ≥ Vi,zni (tni ) implies that the probability with which
bidder i can buy the good from j, and hence i’s payoff at resale, vanishes as n enlarges.
Step 4: Y n balances the winner’s curse Combining (97) with (98) yields
lim
n→∞
(
Y n − E [Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ])
≥ lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
] (
wˆn (tni , t−i)− cni −
(
tni − pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−i)
)
qij
(
tni , t−i, β¯
n
))∣∣∣ t−i ∈ Ωni ] .
To calculate the right-hand side, let t−i range within Ωni such that tj < Vi,zni (tni ). Then
mechanism Mn operates under rule (c), and i’s payoff wˆn (tni , t−i) is equal to either t
n
i if
Vi,zni (tni ) > maxk/∈{i,j}Vk,cni ,β¯n(tk), (99)
or the payment
V −1
k,cni ,β¯
n
(
max
{
Vi,zni (tni ), maxh/∈{i,j,k}Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
})
(100)
from some bidder k /∈ {i, j} if
Vk,cni ,β¯n(tk) > max
{
Vi,zni (tni ), maxh/∈{i,j,k}Vh,,cni ,β¯n(th)
}
. (101)
By Eq. (88) and zni →n zi, tni →n ti and continuity of the mapping x 7→ Vi,x(ti), we have
limn→∞ Vi,zni (ti) = Vi,zi(ti),
limn→∞ Vk′,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(tk′) = Vk′,zk′ (tk′) = limn→∞ Vk′,cni ,β¯n(tk′),
limn→∞ Vi,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t
n
i ) = Vi,zi(ti) = limn→∞ Vi,zni (tni ).
Then for all sufficiently large n, the event (99) is approximated by
Vi,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t
n
i ) > max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(tk)
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(which means if j wins j would resell to i since tj < Vi,zni (tni ) ≈ Vi,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(tni )), and the
event (101) is approximated by
Vk,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(tk) > max
{
Vi,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t
n
i ), max
h/∈{i,j,k}
Vh,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(th)
}
(which means j would resell to k), with the payment (100) approximated by pk,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−k).
Thus, for all t−i ∈ Ωni with tj < Vi,zni (tni ) except a subset whose measure is O(1/n),
wˆn (tni , t−i) +O(1/n) = t
n
i qij(t
n
i , t−k, β¯
n) +
∑
k∈I\{i,j}
qkj(tk, t−k, β¯n)pk,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−k)
and hence
wˆn (tni , t−i)−
(
tni − pi,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−i)
)
qij
(
tni , t−i, β¯
n
)
+O(1/n)
=
∑
k∈I\{j}
qkj(tk, t−k, β¯n)pk,j,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(t−k),
which is equal toWj
(
tni , t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)
because tj < Vi,zni (tni ) implies tj < Vi,β¯nj (tj),β¯n(tni )
for all sufficiently large n, at which bidder j, upon winning, always resells the good. Thus,
lim
n→∞
(
Y n − E [Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ])
≥ lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
] (
Wj
(
tni , t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)− cni )∣∣ t−i ∈ Ωni ] .
Combining this with Eq. (96), as well as the facts limn→∞ cni = b∗ by Eq. (42) and b∗ =
limn→∞ β¯nj (tj) for all tj such that β¯
n
j (tj) ∈ (cni , bni ), we have
lim
n→∞
(
W i
(
cni , t
n
i , β¯
n
)− cni − E [Li(t−i | tni , β¯n) | t−i ∈ Ωni ])
≥ lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
tj < Vi,zni (tni )
] (
Wj
(
tni , t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)− β¯nj (tj))∣∣ t−i ∈ Ωni ] ,
which is Eq. (47). This proves the lemma.
E.8 Proof of Lemma 12
Pick any tj ∈ (aj, zj). By Lemma 6,
β¯nj (tj) ≤ E
[
Wj
(
t−j | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
) ∣∣∣∣maxk 6=j β¯nk (tk) < β¯nj (tj)
]
.
Taking the limit and using Eq. (87), we have
lim
n→∞
β¯nj (tj) ≤ Eti
[
lim
n→∞
Et−(i,j)
[
Wj
(
t−j | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
) ∣∣∣∣ maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk) < β¯nj (tj)
]∣∣∣∣ ti ≤ zi] .
59
By Eq. (19) the winning bid β¯nj (tj) is not an atom of β¯
n
−j, so the Wj
(
t−j | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)
on
the right-hand side obeys Eq. (7) and hence is determined by the virtual utility functions(
Vk,β¯nj (tj),β¯n
)
k 6=j
. By Lemma 21, for each k 6= j, Vk,β¯nj (tj),β¯n →n Vk,zk , which is the virtual
utility function given distribution Fk(·)/Fk(zk). Thus, Wj
(
t−j | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)
converges to
the type-tj reseller j’s expected payoff from the Myerson auction M(z, tj) defined in §A.1.
I.e., with the ϕi defined in Eq. (61) where ζk and αi are zk here,
lim
n→∞
Et−(i,j)
[
Wj
(
ti, t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
) ∣∣∣∣ maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk) < β¯nj (tj)
]
= ϕi(ti, tj). (102)
Denote ϕi(tj) := Eti [ϕi(ti, tj) | ti ∈ [0, zi]], so the above-displayed inequality means
lim
n→∞
β¯nj (tj) ≤ ϕi(tj). (103)
Denote
ϕ∗(ti) := E [1[tj < zi]ϕi(ti, tj) | tj ∈ (aj, zj)] ,
ϕ∗ := E [1[tj < zi]ϕi(tj) | tj ∈ (aj, zj)] .
Note that ϕ∗(zi) ≥ ϕ∗. Otherwise, by continuity of ϕ∗ (Corollary 3), ϕ∗ < ϕ∗ on an interval
(θ, zi] for some θ < zi, which contradicts Ineq. (63) of Corollary 3, with (i, j, (aj,min{zi, zi}))
being (i, i∗, S) there. Plugging the definitions of ϕ∗ and ϕ∗ into ϕ∗(zi) ≥ ϕ∗, we have
Etj [1 [tj < zi] (ϕi(zi, tj)− ϕi(tj))| tj ∈ (aj, zj)] ≥ 0.
Replace ϕi(zi, tj) with the left-hand side of Eq. (102) for the case ti = zi, switch the positions
of the integration and the limit operators and then use Ineq. (103) to obtain
lim
n→∞
E
1 [tj < zi] (Wj (zi, t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n)− β¯nj (tj))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ tj ∈ (aj, zj);maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk) < β¯nj (tj)
 ≥ 0.
(104)
We construct a sequence (tni )
∞
n=1 converging to zi such that β¯
n
i (t
n
i ) = c
n
i for each n
and Ineq. (48) holds. To this end, first recall
(
β¯n
)−1
i
(cni ) 6= ∅ by Eq. (39). By Eq. (87),(
β¯n
)−1
i,sup
(cni ) the supremum of this inverse image converges to zi as n → ∞. Thus, there
exists (tni )
∞
n=1 such that t
n
i ∈
(
β¯n
)−1
i
(cni ) for each n and t
n
i →n zi. Second, denote
hn(ti) := E
1 [tj < zi]Wj (ti, t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ tj ∈ (aj, zj);maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nk (tk) < β¯nj (tj)
 .
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Note that (hn)∞n=1 is equicontinuous at zi by Corollary 2, with (i, j, z
n) being (i, i∗, ζn) there.
The corollary is applicable because the integration domain is a subset in T−i of strictly posi-
tive measure and the integrandWj
(
ti, t−(i,j) | β¯nj (tj), tj, β¯n
)
is reseller j’s ex post payoff in the
regular (hence semi-regular) resale environment ζn. Thus, there exists a subsequence (t
nγ
i )
∞
γ=1
such that hn(t
nγ
i ) ≥ hn(zi)− 1/γ for any γ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Plugging this into (104), we have
lim
γ→∞
E
1 [tj < zi] (Wj (tnγi , t−(i,j) | β¯nγj (tj), tj, β¯nγ)− β¯nγj (tj))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ tj ∈ (aj, zj);maxk/∈{i,j} β¯nγk (tk) < β¯nγj (tj)
 ≥ 0.
On the left-hand side, since a
nγ
j →γ aj and znγj →γ zj by Eq. (30), the part tj ∈ (aj, zj) in
the conditioned event can be replaced by tj ∈ (anγj , znγj ), and the entire conditioned event
can be replaced by the pivotal event Ω
nγ
i by Eqs. (40) and (45). Since zi is a limit point
of (tni )
∞
n=1, with Vi,zi continuous and Vi,zi(zi) = zi, the indicator function 1 [tj < zi] can be
replaced by 1
[
tj < Vi,znγi (t
nγ
i )
]
. Hence we obtain Ineq. (48), and the lemma is proved.
E.9 Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose not, say b∗ > r is a consequential atom of β∗j . By Theorem 2, no bidder other than j
has an atom at b∗. Let (δn)∞n=1 and ((aj, zj), (a
n
j , z
n
j )
∞
n=1) be those specified in Lemma 7. For
any i 6= j, define cni by Eq. (39). Since b∗ > r, limn→∞ (b∗ − δn −maxi6=j cni ) = 0; otherwise,
since the auction is first-price, bidder j with types in (anj , z
n
j ) would deviate to a bid d
n
j ∈ Bmnj
such that maxi6=j cni < d
n
j < b∗ − δn. With I \ {j} finite, there exist an i ∈ I \ {j} and an
infinite subsequence (nk)
∞
k=1 along which c
nk
i = maxj′∈J\{j} c
nk
j′ for all k. As no one but j has
an atom at b∗, Eq. (40) holds. Since limn→∞ (b∗ − δn −maxi6=j cni ) = 0, cnki < b∗ + δnk and
b∗ + δnk − cnki = O(δnk). Furthermore, b∗ is consequential by hypothesis of the lemma. The
rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 2 starting from Eq. (40).
F Details of the Payoff-Security Theorem
F.1 Proof of Lemma 13
With atom r, let the subsequences (β¯n)∞n=1, (δn)
∞
n=1 and ((ai, zi), (a
n
i , z
n
i )
∞
n=1)i∈I be the ones
specified in Lemma 7. By Corollary 1, r is an atom only for bidder j. Hence inf{tj : β∗j (tj) =
r} = aj < zj and ai = zi for all i 6= j. Suppose, to the contrary of the lemma, that aj < r.
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By Eq. (28), the β¯n-bids from bidder j with types converging to anj from above belong
to (r − δn, r + δn). Revealed preference from the viewpoint of these types, coupled with the
consequentiality of r, implies that j’s expected payoff from winning given type anj is greater
than or equal to r−δn (Lemma 6). Since r is not an atom of β∗−j, this inequality is preserved
at the limit. Hence W j(r, aj, β
∗) ≥ r. As W j(r, aj, β∗) is a convex combination between
j’s use value aj and the resale revenue extracted from other bidders, this inequality coupled
with aj < r implies that there exists a k 6= j for whom zk > r. Pick i ∈ I \ {j} such that
zi = max
k 6=j
zk.
Let ∆Uni (ti) := Ui(b
n
i , t, β¯
n) − Ui(l, t, β¯n) denote the payoff difference for i rendered by the
bid increase from the losing bid l to
bni := min {bi ∈ Bmni : bi ≥ r + δn}
at β¯n. Since r is not an atom of β∗k unless k = j,
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
l < max
k 6=j
β¯nk (tk) < b
n
i
}
= 0. (105)
We shall prove that lim supn→∞∆U
n
i (z
n
i ) > 0. If true, that means for all large n, ∆U
n
i (z
n
i ) >
0 and hence, by continuity (Lemma 5), bidder i’s types converging to zni from below, which
are supposed to bid l, would rather bid bni , a desired contradiction.
To this end, use Eq. (10) to obtain
lim
n→∞
∆Uni (z
n
i ) = lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
bni > max
k 6=i
β¯nk (tk)
] (
Wi(t−i | bni , zni , β¯n)− bni − Li(t−i | zni , β¯n)
)]
≥ lim
n→∞
E
[
1
[
bni > max
k 6=i
β¯nk (tk)
] (
zni − r − Lij(t−i | zni , β¯n)
)]
,
where the inequality uses the facts W i(b
n
i , z
n
i , β¯
n) ≥ zni to replace W i with zni , bni →n r to
replace bni with r, and Eqs. (31) and (105) to replace Li with Lij. With r consequential,
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
bni > max
k 6=i
β¯nk (tk)
}
≥
∏
k 6=i
Fk(zk) > 0.
Thus, to prove lim supn∆U
n
i (z
n
i ) > 0 it suffices to show
lim
n→∞
E
[
zni − r − Lij(t−i | zni , β¯n)
∣∣∣∣bni > maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk)
]
> 0. (106)
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To show that, apply Lemma 22 to the case where tni = z
n
i and c
n
i = l for each n. (The lemma
is applicable due to the choice of i and Eq. (105), which implies Eq. (40) that is required for
the lemma.) Thus, by Ineq. (90),
lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | zni , β¯n)
∣∣∣∣bni > maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk); tj < zni
]
< zi − r.
Thus, with Li ≥ 0 by definition of the resale mechanism, zi − r > 0 and hence Pr{tj < zni |
tj < z
n
j } > 0 for all sufficiently large n. Therefore, since Li(t−i | zni , β¯n) > 0 only if tj < zni ,
lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | zni , β¯n)
∣∣∣∣bni > maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk)
]
≤ lim
n→∞
E
[
Li(t−i | zni , β¯n)
∣∣∣∣bni > maxk 6=i β¯nk (tk); tj < zni
]
< zi − r,
which implies (106), as desired.
F.2 Proof of Lemma 15
Let a serious bid b∗ be an inconsequential atom of β∗. By definition of inconsequentiality,,
there exists a bidder i for whom b∗ is not an atom of β∗i , so that Pr {β∗k(tk) > b∗} = 1 and
hence limm→∞ Pr {βmk (tk) > b∗} = 1. Since ∪∞m=1Bmi is dense in the space of serious bids due
to Eq. (21), there is a sequence (bmi )
∞
m=1 converging to b∗ with b
m
i ∈ Bmi for each m. Then
Pr {β∗i (ti) > b∗} = lim
m→∞
Pr {βmi (ti) > bmi } = 1. (107)
To prove by contradiction, suppose b∗ is an atom of β∗k for all k 6= i. Denote for any m
bmi := min {b ∈ Bmi : βmi = b on some (x, x′) ⊆ Ti with x < x′} ,
b∗i := inf{β∗i (t′i) : t′i > 0}.
For each k 6= i and any m, denote
zmk := (β
m)−1k,sup (b
m
i ) ,
zk := (β
∗)−1k,sup (b
∗
i ) .
Since βm → β∗, bmi →m b∗i and zk is a limit point of (zmk )∞m=1. Extracting a converging
subsequence and relabeling if necessary, assume that zmk →m zk for each k 6= i. Note that
zk > 0 for each k 6= i, as b∗ is an atom of β∗k .
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Note that b∗i is not an atom of β
∗
i . Otherwise, since b
∗
i ≥ b∗ (Eq. (107)) and b∗ is an
atom of β∗−i, b
∗
i would be a consequential atom and hence by Corollary 1 and the fact b∗ ≥ r
we have b∗i = b∗ = r, meaning that r is a consequential tie, contradicting Theorem 2. By the
same token, for any k 6= i, the interval (b∗i ,∞) contains no atom of β∗k .
Choose a j 6= i such that zj = maxk 6=i zk. To derive a desired contradiction, we shall
prove that some types of bidder j that are supposed to bid below bmi at the m-equilibrium
would rather deviate to a slightly higher bid for large m.
Step 1: The price markup By definition of bmi and monotonicity of β
m
i , there is a
sequence (tmi )
∞
m=1 such that β
m
i (t
m
i ) = b
m
i for each m and t
m
i →m 0. Then for all sufficiently
large m, zmj > t
m
i .
Since zj = maxk 6=i zk and zmk →m zk for all k 6= i, for each m there exists m ≥ 0 such
that zmk − m ≤ zmj for each k /∈ {i, j} and m → 0. Thus, for each t−(i,j) ∈ T−(i,j) such that
tk ≤ zmk − m for each k /∈ {i, j}, if bidder i wins with bid bmi (hence tk ≤ zmk for all k 6= i),
we have zmj > t
m
i (for all large m) and
Vk,bmi ,βm(tk) ≤ tk ≤ zmk − m ≤ zmj
(3)
= maxVj,bmi ,βm ,
hence the resale price pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
)
for j obeys Eq. (6). With the notation in (44),
pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
)
= V−1j,zmj
(
max
{
tmi , max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,zmk (tk)
})
.
Since zmk →m zk, m → 0, tmi →m 0, and the functions Vk,zmk and x 7→ V−1k,x(v) are continuous,
lim
m→∞
E
[
pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
) | ∀k /∈ {i, j} : tk ≤ zmk − m]
= E
[
V−1j,zj
(
max
{
0, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,zk(tk)
})∣∣∣∣ ∀k /∈ {i, j} : tk ≤ zk] .
By Eq. (52) and the fact Vk,zmk →m Vk,zk for each k 6= i,
lim
m→∞
W i (b
m
i , t
m
i , β
m) = E
[
max
{
0,max
k 6=i
Vk,zk(tk)
}∣∣∣∣ ∀k 6= i : tk ≤ zk] .
These two equations combined with Ineq. (53), which is due to zj = maxk 6=i zk > 0, imply
lim
m→∞
(
E
[
pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
) | ∀k /∈ {i, j} : tk ≤ zmk − m]−W i (bmi , tmi , βm)) > 0.
Since βmi (t
m
i ) = b
m
i , W i (b
m
i , t
m
i , β
m) ≥ bmi by Lemma 6, the above inequality implies
lim
m→∞
(
E
[
pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
) | ∀k /∈ {i, j} : tk ≤ zmk − m]− bmi ) > 0.
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Thus, there exists η ∈ (0, zj/λ) such that
lim
m→∞
(
E
[
pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
) | ∀k /∈ {i, j} : tk ≤ zmk − m]− bmi )− 5η > 0, (108)
with λ the positive constant specified in Lemma 2.a.ii.
Step 2: Construct a deviation for bidder j For any m, if b′, b ∈ Bmi then for each
k 6= i, neither bids are atom of βmk , by Eq. (19). Hence both b′i and bi satisfy Eq. (4). If in
addition b′ > b then, by Eqs. (3) and (4),
Vk,b,βm(tk)−Vk,b′,βm(tk) =

−Fk((β
m)−1k,sup(b
′))−Fk((βm)−1k,sup(b))
fk(tk)
if tk ≤ (βm)−1k,sup (b)
Vk,b′,βm(tk)− (βm)−1k,sup (b) if (βm)−1k,sup (b) ≤ tk ≤ (βm)−1k,sup (b′)
(βm)−1k,sup (b
′)− (βm)−1k,sup (b) if tk ≥ (βm)−1k,sup (b′).
Consequently, with fk > 0 on the compact Tk for all k,
|Vk,b,βm(tk)− Vk,b′,βm(tk)| = O
(
Fk
(
(βm)−1k,sup (b
′)
)
− Fk
(
(βm)−1k,sup (b)
))
.
Thus, there exists ξ > 0 such that, for any m and any k 6= i,
Pr {b < βmk (tk) < b′} < ξ =⇒ ‖Vk,b′,βm − Vk,b,βm‖sup < ηλ/|I|. (109)
Since the limit b∗i of (b
m
i )
∞
m=1 is not an atom of the limit β
∗
i of (β
m
i )
∞
m=1, and (b
∗
i ,∞) contains
no atom of the limit β∗−i of
(
βm−i
)∞
m=1
, by Lemma 20 there exists δ ∈ (0, η/2) for which
lim
m→∞
(sup {ti : βmi (ti) ≤ bmi + δ}) < ηλ, (110)
lim
m→∞
Pr {∃k 6= i : bmi < βmk (tk) ≤ bmi + δ} < min
{
ξ, η,
η
maxk∈I tk
}
. (111)
For each m, let
bmj := min
{
b ∈ Bmj : b > b∗i + δ
}
,
cmj := max
{
βmj (tj) : tj < z
m
j
}
,
∆Umj (tj) := Ui(b
m
j , tj, β
m)− Ui(cmj , tj, βm).
Step 3: Bidder j’s strict incentive to deviate For each m, by definition of cmj , there
is a nondegenerate interval (xm, zmj ) such that β
m
j (tj) = c
m
j for all tj ∈ (xm, zmj ). Also note
cmj ≤ βmj (zmj ) < bmi by monotonicity of βmj , the definition of zmj , and Eq. (19). Thus, since
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bmi →m b∗i , cmj ≤ b∗i < bmj for all sufficiently large m. We shall derive the desired contradiction
by proving that for sufficiently large m some elements of (xm, zmj ) strictly prefer to deviate
from their m-equilibrium bid cmj to the bid b
m
j . By continuity of ∆U
m
j (Lemma 5), it suffices
to show limm→∞∆Umj (z
m
j ) > 0.
Substep 3.a: The probability of winning Now that cmj < b
m
i for large m,
lim
m→∞
Pr
{
βmi (ti) > c
m
j
} ≥ lim
m→∞
Pr {βmi (ti) ≥ bmi } = 1,
with the equality due to the definition of bmi . Hence
lim
m→∞
Uj(c
m
j , tj, β
m) = lim
m→∞
ELj(t−j | tj, βm)
for any tj ∈ Tj by Eq. (10). Thus, again by Eq. (10),
lim
m→∞
∆Umj (zj) = lim
m→∞
Pr
{
bmj > max
k 6=j
βmk (tk)
}
Π
m
j (z
m
j ),
where
Π
m
j (z
m
j ) := E
[
Wj(t−j | bmj , zmj , βm)− bmj − Li(t−j | zmj , βm)
∣∣∣∣bmj > maxk 6=j βmk (tk)
]
. (112)
By definition of b∗i being inf{β∗i (t′i) : t′i > 0}, Pr {b∗i ≤ β∗i (ti) ≤ b∗i + δ} > 0. Consequently,
by definition of bmj as well as the fact that zk > 0 for all k 6= i,
lim
m→∞
Pr
{
bmj > max
k 6=j
βmk (tk)
}
≥ Pr {b∗i ≤ β∗i (ti) ≤ b∗i + δ}
∏
k/∈{i,j}
Fk(zk) > 0.
Thus, it suffices to show limm→∞Π
m
j (z
m
j ) > 0.
Substep 3.b: The resale prices By (111), for any large enough m and any k 6= i,
bmi ≤ βmi (ti) ≤ bmi +δ ⇒ Pr {bmi < βmk (tk) < βmi (ti)} < ξ
(109)⇒ ∥∥Vk,βmi (ti),βm − Vk,bmi ,βm∥∥sup < ηλ/|I|.
Thus, by (110) and the fact tmi →m 0, we have for any sufficiently large m, any t−(i,j) ∈ T−(i,j)
and any ti such that b
m
i ≤ βmi (ti) ≤ bmi + δ,
max
{
ti, max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,βmi (ti),βm(tk)
}
−max
{
tmi , max
k/∈{i,j}
Vk,bmi ,βm(tk)
}
> −2ηλ. (113)
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By Eq. (6), the two terms on the left-hand side of (113) can be inverted into j’s resale prices
via the inverses of his posterior virtual utility functions. Thus, with the derivatives of the
inverses bounded from above by 1/λ (Lemma 2.a.ii). Hence
pj,i,βmi (ti),βm
(
ti, t−(i,j)
)− pj,i,bmi ,βm (tmi , t−(i,j)) > −2η (114)
for any t−(i,j) ∈ T−(i,j) such that tk ≤ zmk − m for each k /∈ {i, j} and any ti such that
bmi ≤ βmi (ti) ≤ bmi + δ. The applicability of Eq. (6) to the resale price pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
)
has been explained at Step 1, and its applicability to pj,i,βmi (ti),βm
(
ti, t−(i,j)
)
, with βmi (ti)
playing the role bi, is because for large m we have ti < z
m
j (b
m
i ≤ βmi (ti) ≤ bmi + δ implies
via (110) that ti < ηλ < z
m
i for large m) and, for each k /∈ {i, j},
Vk,βmi (ti),βm(tk) ≤ tk ≤ zmk − m ≤ zmj = (βm)−1j,sup (bmi ) ≤ (βm)−1j,sup (βmi (ti)) .
Integrating (114) across the (ti, t−(i,j)) quantified above, we have, for all large m,
E
[
pj,i,βmi (ti),βm
(
ti, t−(i,j)
) | bmi ≤ βmi (ti) < bmj ;∀k /∈ {i, j} [tk ≤ zmk − m]]
≥ E [pj,i,bmi ,βm (tmi , t−(i,j)) | ∀k /∈ {i, j} [tk ≤ zmk − m]]− 2η.
This combined with Ineq. (108) and δ < η/2 (which implies bmj < b
∗
i + η by the definition
of bmj ; then by b
m
i →m b∗i we have bmj < bmi + η for all large m) gives
lim
m→∞
(
E
[
pj,i,βmi (ti),βm
(
ti, t−(i,j)
) | bmi ≤ βmi (ti) < bmj ;∀k /∈ {i, j} [tk ≤ zmk − m]]− bmj )
≥ lim
m→∞
(
E
[
pj,i,bmi ,βm
(
tmi , t−(i,j)
) | ∀k /∈ {i, j} [tk ≤ zmk − m]]− 2η − (bmi + η))
> 5η − 2η − η = 2η. (115)
Substep 3.c: Bidder j’s opportunity cost of winning:
lim
m→∞
E
[
Lji(t−j | zmj , βm)
∣∣∣∣bmj > maxk 6=j βmk (tk)
]
(111)
≤ lim
m→∞
E
[
Lji(t−j | zmj , βm)
∣∣∣∣bmj > maxk 6=j βmk (tk); bmi > maxk/∈{i,j} βmk (tk)
]
+ η
= lim
m→∞
E
[
Lji(t−j | zmj , βm)
∣∣∣∣bmj > maxk 6=j βmk (tk);∀k /∈ {i, j} [tk ≤ zmk − m]
]
+ η
= lim
m→∞
E
[
zmj − pj,i,βmi (ti),βm
(
ti, t−(i,j)
) | bmj > βmi (ti);∀k /∈ {i, j} [tk ≤ zmk − m]]+ η
(115)
< lim
m→∞
(
zmj − bmj
)− η;
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here the first equality is because the difference between the events bmi > maxk/∈{i,j} β
m
k (tk)
and ∀k /∈ {i, j} [tk ≤ zmk − m] vanishes as m → ∞; the second equality is due to tk ≤
zmk − m ≤ zmj for all k /∈ {i, j} and ti < zmj for large m (due to Ineq. (110) and η < zj).
Ineq. (111) also implies that for any k /∈ {i, j}
lim
m→∞
E
[
1
[
βmk (tk) > max
l /∈{j,k}
βml (tl)
]
Ljk(t−j | zmj , βm)
∣∣∣∣bmj > maxk 6=j βmk (tk)
]
< η.
Combining the two inequalities displayed above with Eq. (9), we have
lim
m→∞
E
[
Lj(t−j | zmj , βm)
∣∣∣∣bmj > maxk 6=j βmk (tk)
]
< lim
m→∞
(
zmj − bmj
)
.
Therefore, by Eq. (112) and the fact Wj(t−j | bmj , zmj , βm) ≥ zmj ,
lim
m→∞
Π
m
j (z
m
j ) ≥ lim
m→∞
(
zmj − bmj − E
[
Lj(t−j | zmj , βm)
∣∣∣∣bmj > maxk 6=j βmk (tk)
])
> 0,
as desired.
G Proof of Lemma 16
We start with two lemmas, given the hypothesis that a sequence (bmi )
∞
m=1 of grid points
converges to a bi that is not an atom of β
∗
−i. By Eq. (19), none of b
m
i is an atom of β
m
−i.
Lemma 23 For any k ∈ I and any tk ∈
[
0, (β∗)−1k,sup (bi)
)
,
lim
m→∞
Vk(tk | bmi , βm) = Vk(tk | bi, β∗). (116)
Proof Since neither bmi is an atom of β
m
k nor bi an atom of β
∗
k , Lemma 2.a.i is applicable.
Thus, for any tk ∈
[
0, (β∗)−1k,sup (bi)
)
, Vk(tk | bi, β∗) obeys Eq. (4) with (β∗)−1k,sup (bi) being
the β−1k,sup(bi) there; for large enough m, such tk also belongs to
[
0, (βm)−1k,sup (b
m
i )
]
and hence
Vk(tk | bmi , βm) also obeys Eq. (4) with (βm)−1k,sup (bmi ) being the β−1k,sup(bi) there. Since bi is not
an atom of β∗k , the mass of tk between (β
m)−1k,sup (b
m
i ) and (β
∗)−1k,sup (bi) vanishes as b
m
i → bi.
Thus, Fk
(
(βm)−1k,sup (b
m
i )
)
→m Fk
(
(β∗)−1k,sup (bi)
)
. Hence Eq. (116) follows.
Lemma 24 For any i ∈ I, any ti ∈ Ti and any measurable subset S ⊆ T−i,
lim
m→∞
E [Li(t−i | ti, βm)1[S]] = E [Li(t−i | ti, β∗)1[S]] . (117)
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Proof By definition of Li in Eq. (9), Li(t−i | ti, β∗) equals zero unless t−i belongs to the set
S ′ :=
{
t−i ∈ T−i : β∗j (tj) > l for some j 6= i
}
.
Since βm → β∗ and l is isolated from [0,∞), limm→∞ Li(t−i | ti, βm) = 0 by Eq. (9) unless
t−i ∈ S ′. Thus, it suffices to prove (117) with the integration domain S replaced with S∩S ′.
First, consider any t−i ∈ S ′ at which the highest bid β∗j (tj) among rivals of i is
not an atom of β∗−j. Then Eq. (116) holds for all k 6= j with the role (bmi , bi) played by
(βmj (tj), β
∗
j (tj)), and Eqs. (6) and (8) hold with respect to β
∗. Eqs. (6) and (8) also hold
with respect to βm due to Eq. (19). Thus,
lim
m→∞
Li(t−i | ti, βm) = Li(t−i | ti, β∗). (118)
Second, consider the other kind of t−i in S ′, the elements of
S ′′ :=
{
t−i ∈ S ′ : ∃j 6= i
[
β∗j (tj) ≥ max
k/∈{i,j}
β∗k(tk); β
∗
j (tj) is an atom of β
∗
−j
]}
.
Since there are at most countably many atoms of β∗−j, we can discard any t−i ∈ S ′′ such
that β∗j (tj) is not an atom of β
∗
j , as all such t−i constitute only a zero-measure subset of T−i.
Thus, suppose that β∗j (tj) is an atom of both β
∗
j and β
∗
−j. Then β
∗
j (tj) would be a tie, which is
impossible by Theorem 2, unless β∗j (tj) is inconsequential. Now that β
∗
j (tj) is inconsequential,
Lemma 15 (applicable because β∗j (tj) > l, as t−i ∈ S ′) implies that there are at least two
bidders whose bid functions in β∗ do not have β∗j (tj) as an atom. One of them is a bidder k
different than the i in this lemma, and Eq. (107) implies Pr
{
β∗k(tk) > β
∗
j (tj)
}
= 1 and
limm→∞
{
βmk (tk) > β
m
j (tj)
}
= 1. The first equation says that those t−(i,j) at which β∗j (tj)
wins against β∗−j constitute a zero-measure set, and the second says that the measure of
those t−(i,j) at which βmj (tj) wins against β
m
−j shrinks to zero as m→∞. Thus,
lim
m→∞
E [Li(t−i | ti, βm)1 [S ′′]] = 0 = E [Li(t−i | ti, β∗)1 [S ′′]] .
Eq. (117) is obtained by summing this equation with the integration of Eq. (118) across all
t−i ∈ S ∩ S ′ \ S ′′.
Now that bi is not an atom of β
∗
−i, nor b
m
i an atom of β
m
−i, the winning event is simplified
by Eq. (22). Thus, by Eq. (10), with the symbol ti suppressed,
Ui(b
m
i , β
m) = E
[
1
[
bmi > max
k 6=i
βmk (tk)
]
(Wi(t−i | bmi , βm)− bmi − Li(t−i | βm))
]
+ E [Li(t−i | βm)] ,
Ui(bi, β
∗) = E
[
1
[
bi > max
k 6=i
β∗k(tk)
]
(Wi(t−i | bi, β∗)− bi − Li(t−i | β∗))
]
+ E [Li(t−i | β∗)] .
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Here Wi(t−i | bmi , βm) and Wi(t−i | bi, β∗) obey Eq. (7) with virtual utility functions
(Vk(· | bmi , βm))k 6=i and (Vk(· | bi, β∗))k 6=i, because the condition for (7) is guaranteed by the
indicator functions 1 [bmi > maxk 6=i β
m
k (tk)] and 1 [bi > maxk 6=i β
∗
k(tk)]. Since b
m
i →m bi and
bi is not an atom of β
∗
−i, Eq. (116) applies. Thus, by Eqs. (6) and (7),
lim
m→∞
Wi(t−i | bmi , βm) =Wi(t−i | bi, β∗) a.e. t−i ∈ T−i.
As βm → β∗ and bi is not an atom of β∗−i, we also have
lim
m→∞
1
[
bmi > max
k 6=i
βmk (tk)
]
= 1
[
bi > max
k 6=i
β∗k(tk)
]
a.e. t−i ∈ T−i.
Combining these two equations with Eq. (117) yields the conclusion of the lemma.
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